AN
ANSWER
To a PAMPHLET call'd, The
CONDUCT
OF THE
MINISTRY
Impartially Examined.

In which it is proved,

That neither *Imbecillity* nor *Ignorance* in the M——r have been the CAUSES of the preſent unhappy SITUATION of this NATION.

By the *AUTHOR* of the FOUR LETTERS to the People of *England.*

Falſus honor juvat, et mendax infamia terret;
Quem niſi mendoſum et mendacem. HOR.

LONDON:

Printed for M. COOPER, at the *Globe*, *Pater-noſter-Row.*
MDCCLVI.

[Price One Shilling and Sixpence.]

TO THE

AUTHOR

OF THE

Conduct of the Miniſtry impartially examined.

SIR,

BEFORE I take Notice of the perſonal Attacks upon me, in the introductory Part of your Defence of the Miniſtry, I ſhall examine the Juſtneſs of your Arguments in their Behalf; how well you have executed your Attempt; how impartially you have adhered to Truth; and what Degree of Credit ought to be paid to that which you have written. I ſhall then leave it to our Readers to decide, whether the Aſperſions you have ſo liberally beſtowed upon me, may not, with more Equity, be retorted upon yourſelf; whether *you*

or *I* appear to be moſt like the *Thief* and *Knave*; and whether you do not reſemble a *ſubborn'd Evidence*, in favour of a *Criminal* your *Accomplice*, in ſupporting the *M——rs*, more than I do a common Incendiary in the *Fourth Letter to the People of* England. After having finiſh'd your introductory Leaves, where you ſay, in the laſt Paragraph of the eighth Page (how truly I ſhall ſhew hereafter) "That you intend neither Panegyric "nor *Abuſe*, but the *Cauſe* of your Country "only, *&c.*" You then begin, "But be- "fore I enter upon this Taſk, give me "Leave to take ſome little Notice of a "Pamphlet which has been juſt now put "into my Hands; and which I am told has "met with Attention from the Public, on "account I imagine, of the Facts it is ſup- "poſed to contain; for ſurely, if I, who "am no Author, may venture to pronounce "on the Stile and manner of Writing, both "are below Criticiſm."

INDEED *you* may venture to pronounce any thing, who have pronounced the Abſurdities which ſhall be ſhewn in the following Pages; but as a Sample of our Stiles, let our Readers compare what you have tranſcribed from the *Fourth Letter*, with what

is

is to be found in your own, and then decide.

You then ſay, " The charge opens againſt " the Miniſtry, or rather againſt Truth and " Matter of Fact," and cloſe the Paragraph with ſaying, my own Words will ſhew me in the true Colours of a Libeller, which you quote, " In the Year One thouſand Seven " hundred and Forty-nine or Fifty, ſome " *American* Traders, Subjects of the King " of *Great Britain*, travelled to the Borders " of the *Ohio*, to traffic with the Natives of " thoſe Parts; this being known to the " *Canadian French*, Meſſengers were diſ- " patched to acquaint them, that unleſs they " withdrew from their Maſter's Territories, " their Effects would be confiſcated, and " themſelves carry'd to Priſon at *Quebec*; " this Meſſage the Traders thought fit to " obey, and withdrew in Conſequence of " it.

" The ſucceeding Seaſon another Com- " pany of *Britiſh* Subjects came to trade on " the *Ohio:* and not withdrawing on a like " Meſſage with the former, their Goods " were confiſcated, and themſelves carried " Priſoners to *Quebec*, from whence they

" were brought to *Rochelle* in *France*, AND " STILL DETAINED IN PRISON." By printing theſe Words in Capitals, I ſuggeſt you conceived I meant detained in Priſon when I wrote the Fourth Letter; here you exhibit a very glaring Proof of neither underſtanding Senſe nor Grammar: *were* brought to *Rochelle* and *were* ſtill detained in Priſon, that is at their Time of landing in *France*, is the manifeſt Senſe of theſe Words; otherwiſe I ſhould have ſaid *were* brought and *are* ſtill detained; that they *were* detained in Priſon, you yourſelf confeſs by the firſt Letter from Lord *Albemarle* to Lord *Holderneſſe*. Thus then this firſt Remark of yours, ſo diſtinguiſhed by Capitals, returns with Shame upon yourſelf. You then proceed, " Not conſcious of having violated the Laws " of Nations, or traded on any Ground to " which the King of *Great Britain* had not " an undoubted Right, they *remonſtrated* to " the *Britiſh* Miniſtry, *inſiſted* upon being " claimed as *Britiſh* Subjects, and honour- " ably diſcharged from Priſon, as Perſons " unoffending the Laws of Nations; nay, " they *entertained* the *honourable Hopes* of " *Engliſhmen*, that the *Miniſtry* of *England* " would not ceaſe to *demand* an *Indemnifica-* " *tion* for the Loſs of that Merchandize,

" which

" which had been unjuſtly taken from them,
" and Reparation for the Inſult and long Im-
" priſonment of their Perſons. Expecta-
" tions becoming Men who value their Li-
" berties, Properties, and Nation's Honour:
" *In this they were deceived, the true Spirit*
" *of an* Engliſh M———r *no longer dwelt*
" *amongſt us.*"

Now, Sir, I imagine that the Parts of this Paſſage diſtinguiſhed by Italics, are thoſe, againſt which, you except; otherwiſe you really forget to tell us what particularly gives you ſo much Offence. Let me ſee then, whether the Truth of this cannot be made out by the very Letters which you have quoted as authentic. In the firſt Letter, my Lord *Albemarle* writes to Lord *Holderneſſe*, " In the Month of *November* I received a " Letter from three Perſons, ſigning them-" ſelves *John Patton*, *Luke Erwin*, and *Tho-* " *mas Bourke*, repreſenting to me that they " were *Engliſhmen*, who had been brought " to *Rochelle*, and put into Priſon there, " from whence they wrote: having been " taken by the *French* Subjects, who ſeized " their Effects as they were trading with " the *Engliſh*, and other *Indians*, on the Ri-" ver *Ohio*, and carried them Priſoners to

" *Quebec*;

" *Quebec*; from whence they have been ſent
" over to *Rochelle*, where they are hardly
" uſed."

TELL me then, is it a Violation of Truth to ſay, this Letter ſent by theſe Men to the Embaſſador, was a Remonſtrance to the *Britiſh Miniſtry?* That they *inſiſted* upon being claimed, and that they *entertained* the *honourable Hopes of Engliſhmen* that the *M——y* of *England* would not *ceaſe* to *demand* an *Indemnification*; I ſay, does not this Letter, written by them, prove the Truth of what I affirm'd, tho' Lord *Albemarle* does not expreſs it in that Manner to the Secretary of State, is that a Proof it was not in their Letter to his Lordſhip? Is not this Confeſſion of ſuch a Letter, equal to all I aſſert?

FARTHER, being at *Paris* at that Time, I knew it to be ſo, and will now tell you the Reaſon for their writing in that Manner: They had been in Priſon almoſt two Years from their firſt Captivity; and tho' Remonſtrances had been repeatedly made on that Head, from *America* to the M——r in *England*, (ſhameful Neglect!) no Notice had been taken of the Impriſonment of our *Britiſh* Subjects, to the Court of *France*, by that of *England*.

England. This it was which determined them to apply to Lord *Albemarle*, and ſeek their Liberty that Way. And as to the *Indemnification* for the Loſs of that Merchandize, it is plain the M——y have *ceaſed* from demanding it, nay that they never demanded it at all, unleſs barely naming the Word *demand*, and then relinquiſhing all Right to it, can be denominated *a Demand.*

Now where is the Abſurdity or Faſhood, in ſaying theſe *Men were deceived*, and that *the true Spirit of an* Engliſh Miniſter *no longer dwelt amongſt us.* If it had, would he not have inſiſted on receiving *Reparation* for the Inſult on this Nation; *Indemnification* for the Merchandize unjuſtly taken; and *Satisfaction* to *thoſe* who had been *illegally* impriſoned? And all theſe being never obtained, how much ſhort is it of a Demonſtration that the Men were diſcharged on *a Requeſt*, and not on a *Demand?* or wherefore did the M——rs relinquiſh Claim to the other three *Demands*, if the Subjects of *England* were releaſed in Conſequence of a *Demand?* ſince the *French* in giving them Liberty on ſuch a Remonſtrance, muſt h ve acknowledged the *Engliſh* Right to the other three Articles. Wherefore then did the M——r neglect the latter,

if

if the former were not ſet at Liberty in Conſequence of a *Requeſt*.

You then continue to quote "The Ambaſ-
" ſador at *Paris inſtead of demanding thoſe*
" *Subjects of his Maſter, as Men unjuſtly held*
" *in Priſon, and Reparation for the Wrongs*
" *they had received*, was ordered by the *Mi-*
" *niſtry* to ſolicit as a Favour from the Court
" of *France* the Diſcharge of them, only
" acknowledging their Offence."

In Support of this latter Part only, you can quote the Letters from Lord *Albemarle* to Lord *Holderneſſe*, and Part of a Memorial delivered to Mr. *Rouillé*.

Now, Sir, when I ſaid that Lord *Albemarle* had never *demanded* theſe Men and their Effects, it could not be underſtood that I meant to ſay he had not *aſked* to have them releaſed; becauſe the Men were releaſed. All that could be meant then, was that theſe Men were not releaſed in *Conſequence* of a *Demand*, but of a *Requeſt*. And if this appear to be true, tho' the ſtrict Expreſſion in Lord *Albemarle*'s Letter puts it in the Light of a *Demand*; yet the Circumſtances of the Caſe ſpeak againſt it; and I have not violated the Truth.

Truth. Beſides, the *French* Memorial of Juſtification, given to all the Courts of *Europe*, and printed ſince the writing the *Fourth Letter*, ſtates the Affair as I relate it, in Conſequence of a *Requeſt* *. Thus then the Word of one *M——r* ſuppoſing *your Letter to be authentic*, ſtands directly againſt another, and ought to be equally regarded; only this is to be remarked, that your inſerting the Copy of this Letter never yet printed and avowed to be genuine, is not equal to the Evidence of the *Authenticity of* that *Memorial* printed in all the *Dutch* and other Gazettes, and ſigned by the *French* Miniſters, particularly as our *M——rs* have never made any Reply to prove the Falſhood of the Aſſertion in that Memorial. So far then, the Argument is in my Favour, that theſe Priſoners were never demanded. Let me now endeavour at ſome collateral Proofs to ſuſtain the Truth of what I have aſſerted.

* Le Marquis *de la Jonquiere* envoye cès quatre *Anglois* en *France*. Detenus quelque temps priſonniers à la *Rochelle*, ils implorent la protection de Mylord Albemarle, alors Ambaſſadeur d'*Angleterre*. Ce Seigneur ſolicite *leur liberté ſans ſe plaindre du motif qui les en a privez*. S. M. Très-*Chretienne* ordonne qu'ils ſoient élargis, leur fait même donner quelque argent, & Mylord Albemarle en remercie le Miniſtre de la Marine, comme d'une grace qui lui eſt perſonnelle. En 1751.

First then, if the Priſoners had been releaſed on a *Demand*, why did our *M——rs* diſcontinue to *demand the Indemnification* for our Subjects, and *Reparation* for the Inſult on the *Britiſh* Crown, both which they ceaſed to claim after the Releaſe of the Priſoners, tho' two Years expired between that Time and the committing Hoſtilities againſt *France?* Had we not an equal Claim to all, ſince theſe Particulars were founded on equal Juſtice? Had the Subjects been releaſed on a *Demand*, as you aſſert, the Merchandize muſt have been reſtored alſo? Is it unreaſonable then to conclude, ſince neither the *Inſult* has been acknowledged, nor the *Effects reſtored* or *paid for*, that the Priſoners were not ſet at Liberty on a *Demand?* In farther Support of this, I muſt remark, that Lord *Albemarle* received the Letter from theſe Priſoners in *November*, and that his Letter, giving an Account of their Impriſonment, was in *March*, at leaſt three Months after. Was my Lord *Albemarle* all this while ſilent on this Head to his Court? If he was, how will *he* be juſtified as an Ambaſſador in his Duty towards the Subjects of *England?* or the *M——rs* juſtified in the Choice of ſo negligent a Man? But I am apt to believe, as he ſays, whether he had mentioned it to his Court or not before, that

he had *demanded* the Releaſe of the Priſoners and the Reſtoration of their Effects, if that can be called a Demand of the M——r, before he wrote of it to his Court, and ſoon after he knew the Affair. But you ſee that this Releaſe of the *Priſoners only*, was not comply'd with in *March*, and the Reſtoration of the Effects at no Time; this *Demand* then, if made, had no Effect on the *French*.

Our Embaſſador ſays, in the Beginning of the ſecond Paragraph of his firſt Letter, "I "find by the Paper your Lordſhip has ſent "me, theſe three Perſons are of the Number "of thoſe demanded by Mr. *Clinton*, and "named in Mr. *De la Jonquiere*'s Letter." Now, Sir, unleſs you tell me what Orders accompanied this Paper, I muſt ſtill inſiſt that theſe Priſoners were never *demanded*; or, which was all I meant, and all that has been underſtood by it, never *releaſed* in Conſequence of a *Demand*, but a *Requeſt*.

His Lordſhip adds alſo in this Letter, "next Tueſday *I will* repreſent the Caſe to "Mr. *St. Conteſt*." But does this prove he did it, for you hear no more of it? He ſays in the next Letter, of *March* 8, that he had ſeen Mr. *Rouillé*, and given his Paper of

Complaints, which conſiſt (as quoted in the Memorial by you) of demanding expreſs Orders to be ſent to *De la Jonquiere*, to deſiſt from ſuch unjuſt Proceedings, and in particular to cauſe the Fort at *Niagara* to be razed, and the *French* to retire; as likewiſe to ſet the ſix *Engliſhmen* at Liberty, and to make them ample Satisfaction for their Loſſes and Wrongs; and for the puniſhing the Perſons who had committed theſe Exceſſes.

But does *aſking* a Thing by one Man prove it to be granted by another? on the contrary, Time has ſhewn us, that not a ſingle Article of theſe *Demands* have ever been *comply'd* with; the Fort of *Niagara* remains untouch'd to this Hour; the other three Men in *Canada* were never releaſed. The ſame Conduct has been purſued in *America*, by the *French*, and no Satisfaction made for Loſs of Effects and Liberty to the Priſoners, or Loſs of Honour to the Crown: and the Court appears to be ſatisfied with that vague and indefinite Anſwer which Mr. *Rouillé* gave our Ambaſſador, *That he would uſe his beſt Endeavours for that Purpoſe; that it was the Intention of their Court to prevent Diſputes; and that we might depend upon ſuch Orders being ſent to their Governors accordingly.*

Was

WAS this an Anſwer which ought to have ſatisfied a M———r; and yet on this he has all along reſted, though things continued as juſtly to be complained of as before; and though Lord *Albermarle* ſaid he would examine the two Men which came to *Paris*, in order to ſupport their *receiving Satisfaction*, was it ever done? It was not. And the Reaſon for it was, that our M———r at home, by means of the *French* Ambaſſador in *London*, had obtained, as a *Requeſt*, the Releaſe of theſe three Men, and given up all Claim to the Effects and other Things which were mentioned in the Memorial. Wherefore Lord *Albermarle*, in conſequence of Orders, deſiſted from endeavouring to obtain an Indemnification for the *Britiſh* Subjects.

Now, Sir, will an unprejudiced Man believe, in conſequence of what you have laid down, and of the M———r's Letters, *unauthenticated*, that the Priſoners were diſcharged in compliance to a *Demand*, which has never been complied with in the other Particulars depending on the ſame Cauſe of Complaint againſt *French* Injuſtice? or from what I have ſaid, and the *French* Manifeſto ſign'd by their *M———rs*, *unreply'd to* by the Court of *England*, that the Releaſement

was

was made in Conſequence of a *Requeſt?* Let me now again aſk *you*, If our Sovereign's Rights and our Privileges were not ſhamefully invaded? Were not the Lands on the *Ohio* confeſs'd to belong to the King of *France?* were not the *French* juſtified in impriſoning our Fellow-ſubjects and confiſcating their Goods, by this tame Behaviour of the *B——ſh* M——r. You then add, that I aſſert that the " M——r's *timidly* be- " ſeeching as a Favour what he had a Right " to demand as Juſtice from the *French*, has " given that Nation a better Foundation to " the Claim on the *Ohio.*" And who is there that does not join in this Aſſertion? And then you ſay, in about fifteen Lines lower, " He aſſerts again, That the Timidity " of the M—r gave the *French* no Founda- " tion at all." In this Place you either cannot read, or have exhibted an Example of your Love for Truth ſcarce to be parallel'd; the Words are abſolutely different in themſelves and in their Meaning, as the Paſſage will prove, which is as follows; " If it be " aſked, whence it comes to paſs that this " Behaviour of the *B——ſh* M——r has " never been mentioned in the *French* Me- " morials relative to the Diſputes in *America*; " it may be anſwer'd with Truth, that the

" *French*

" *French* Miniſtry perfectly knew this *ceding*
" the Territories of *England* by the *Timidity*
" of the M——r was no *legal* relinquiſhing
" the *B——ſh* Rights to theſe Lands, and
" that the King and *People* would never ac-
" quieſce in this Conceſſion."

Let me aſk you, If your Effrontery is not extraordinary in this Quotation; nay, much heighten'd by your Declaration in the Beginning, that you have no *Cauſe* to ſerve but that of *Truth* and your *Country?* What is become of that Matter of Fact and Truth which you mention? And how am I a Libeller in the Paragraph you have quoted? What Miſcreant but yourſelf is unacquainted with this Truth, that many Things may afford a *Foundation* for a Claim that do not conſtitute a *legal Right*; otherwiſe by what Means are ſo many Law-ſuits brought into *Weſtminſter-Hall* concerning Property? Are all thoſe who loſe their Suits without *Foundation* for a Claim, becauſe not poſſeſs'd of a *legal* one?

Here then in your own Words I join Iſſue with you, and deſire that our Credit with the Public for *Veracity* and *Candour* in whatever elſe is aſſerted in my Letter and your Libel (at leaſt, if mine is ſo) be determined

by

by the Truth or Falſehood of the Fact before us.

Now, Sir, I will explain to you why Lord *Albemarle* might in all Appearance be employed to *demand* the Priſoner, *&c.* M———rs in *England* know that the P——t may require the Papers of their Tranſactions to be laid before them; wherefore the Face of a Negociation is made, by Memorials and Orders to Embaſſadors, to repreſent ſomething very different from the ſecret Springs and ſecret Manner of accompliſhing the Buſineſs, as I have Reaſon to believe was done in negotiating this very Affair.

After having thus diſproved all you have offer'd, I aſk you, on what Reaſon you preſume to ſay, I have been guilty of Scurrility in the Paſſage you have been quoting? and I tell you, that no Face can well be endowed with more audacious Hardineſs than that of a Man who, whilſt he is condemning a a Writer for Scurrility where it does not exiſt, is, himſelf, the moſt ſcurrilous of all Men; and I believe the M——rs, if they underſtand *Latin*, will, by the time they have read thus far, ſend back your Scrap of that Language to yourſelf, and tell you,

Non

Non tali exilio, nec defenſoribus iſtis
Tempus eget.

Your next Paragraph begins with ſaying, " you had intended to drop me here; but " my next is ſtated as falſely and ignorantly " as this, which we have ſeen ſo unanſwer- " ably confuted." Would not you have acted wiſer in tarrying to ſee what could have been ſaid againſt you, before you had *pronounced* that Paragraph ſo *unanſwerably confuted?* However, to do you Juſtice, this Paragraph is as falſe as the former; for I flatter myſelf, that having proved the former to be true, I ſhall have as much Succeſs with this alſo. Wherefore as things equally true are equally falſe, for once you are right, though in a very different Senſe from what you intended. You then continue, by ſaying, " That I had not the ſmalleſt Knowledge of " what I was writing about; and that I am " unacquainted with the Nature and Form " of Buſineſs; that the M———r is blame- " leſs, and every other Perſon in the Ad—n.

In order to prove this, you give an Account how the Quaker and his Company became poſſeſſed of the Grant of the Lands of the *Ohio*.

You there tell us, " That *Henbury* petition'd " the King for thoſe Lands on certain Con- " ditions; that the Board of Trade thought " this Application was Part of a Former, " tranſmitted by the Lieutenant Governor of " *Virginia*, that it might be for his Majeſty's " Service to comply with this Requeſt, and " accordingly that Inſtructions were ſent on " this Head to the Lieutenant Governor of " *Virginia*. You tell us then the Reſult " of the Opinion of the Board of Trade, " and of their Report; and that this was taken " into Conſideration by the Lords of the " Committee of Council, who agreed in Opi- " nion with the Board of Trade, and accord- " ingly a Draught of an Inſtruction was ap- " proved in Council and tranſmitted to the " Lieutenant Governor."

Your next Paragraph proves, that in Obe- dience to theſe Inſtructions the Grant was made to the *Ohio* Company, becauſe you ſay, " the " Preſident of the Council of *Virginia*, in a " Letter to the Board of Trade 1749, ſet " forth the Difficulties the *Ohio Company* la- " boured under, from the Fickleneſs of the " *Indians*, the Claims of the *Pennſylvanians* " with reſpect to Limits, the Expence of " erecting and garriſoning a Fort." Here it

it evidently appears the Grant was made, otherwiſe there could have been no *Ohio Company*; the Cauſe of the Ficklenefs (as it is called) of the *Indians*, may be determined by what their Chiefs ſaid to our Governors on that Head, printed in the News Papers of *America*, that they knew of no Right which we had to thoſe Lands, either by Treaty or Sale, and oppoſed our ſettling, as they have juſtly done ever ſince; and as to the Expence of erecting and garriſoning a Fort, their begging Indulgences was not only ridiculous but inſolent, becauſe the very Grant, as you ſay Page 22, was aſk'd and comply'd with on theſe Conditions. At the ſame time this Quaker, to give farther Inſtances of his and his Company's Modeſty, after having obtain'd this Grant, and deſired to be indulged with Fort and Garriſon, endeavour to ſhew that the *French* Claim to the *Miſſiſſippi* is not juſt, becauſe it is contrary to a Grant King *Charles* I. made to Sir *Robert Heath*, which was followed by a Settlement of the *Engliſh* long before the *French* had been in thoſe Parts.

Now, Sir, ſhould this Grant of theſe Lands, by *Charles* I. in Conſequence of Priority, be allowed equitable, and which Lands have ſince, by Treaties, been acknowledged to be-

long, and allow'd to remain with the *French*, will it not afford an unlucky Argument againſt all new Families that come to ſettle any where after the former have *abdicated*? Wherefore I think it not defenſible in this Place; however were not the *French* acquainted with this conſcientious Requeſt of the Quaker, and to this is it not chiefly owing that they took care to defend the Poſſeſſion of thoſe Parts, and that the preſent War was brought on?

You then tell us that "the *Ohio Company* "with reſpect to their *Grant*, made no far- "ther Application till 1754, when they pre- "ſented a Petition to his Majeſty; reciting "the former Tranſactions, and adding that "the late Governor and Council had made "large Grants to private Perſons, to the "Amount of near 1,400,000 Acres, *&c.* "and therefore praying that their Boundaries "may be fixed by certain Rivers, *&c.* But "it appearing to the Board of Trade that the "Limits mentioned in the Petition would "include too great a Quantity; (and, you "might have added, robbed as honeſt Men "as themſelves; to whom the 1,400,000 "Acres had been granted, of their juſt Poſſeſ- "ſions) they concluded it ſhould not be com-

"ply'd

" ply'd with, when they propoſed ſome In-
" ſtructions to the Governor, relative to this
" Affair in their Report; (then comes the *Crec m*
" of all in *Italics*; *but this Report ſtill remains*
" *under the Conſideration of the Council, and no*
" *Order at all has been made on it to thi· Day.*

In what Manner does all this contradict what I have ſaid in the Paſſage you refer to? which is, " It ſeems however before this " timid Acquieſcence of the *B——h* M——r " in thus acknowledging that Part of *Ame-* " *rica* to be the Property of *France*, he had " granted the Lands on the *Ohio* to a Qua- " ker of the City of *London* and his Aſſoci- " ates." Do you imagine that the Lords of the Committee, who had given a Power of granting theſe Lands, were not of the M—y? or that it was done without the Conſent of the M——r? or do you conclude becauſe the *Limits are not ſettled* according to the *Ohio* Company's Inclinations, that therefore no Lands *were granted*, and that they were no Company at all? The very Manner in which you relate the Affair, proves the contrary of what you drive at. If there are no *Lands granted*, how came theſe Men to be a *Company?* and if they are not *a Company*, what *Right* had they to complain about the *Condi-*

tion

tion of thoſe Lands; or to petition for a Fort and Garriſon, and *Limits* to be aſcertained for *Parts* in *America* which did *not belong to them?* If two neighbouring Gentlemen diſagree about the Boundaries of their Eſtates, does it thence follow that one or both of them has no Eſtate at all? And yet you conclude, becauſe the *Company ſues* for a *Settlement* of the *Limits* of *their Lands*, that they have for that Reaſon, *no* Grant at all of theſe *Lands*, (admirable Logic!) Your Reaſons are equal to your Love of Truth, and Exhibitions of Modeſty.

THUS, Sir, you have not only not contradicted any Thing I have ſaid, by pretending to give authentic Accounts to the contrary; but you have confirmed alſo that the *French* were not the firſt Aggreſſors in *America*, by ſaying that the Quaker, honeſt Man, not content with his Grant of the *Ohio*, was ſhowing that the *French* had no Right to the *Miſſiſippi*; and by that Means, leading towards a Claim of that Territory alſo. Can it be wondered at, or complained againſt with Juſtice then, that in conſequence of this the *French* prepared to oppoſe an Invaſion, which might be juſtly expected on that Quarter? nay, did not *Waſhington*, by intercepting a Convoy of

French

French Provisions, *begin* Hostilities? and when he was afterwards defeated and taken Prisoner, did he not *acknowledge* this by signing a Paper, in which it was said, he had been guilty of an *Assassination, in attacking the* French? Now, Sir, who best understands what he is writing about, and the Nature of Business? And is not the Quaker proved by you to be the Cause of the War? I fancy by this Time, the M——rs, whom you pretend to defend, will think themselves but little obliged to you for thus justifying the Proceedings of our Enemies; and when next they *chuse* an Advocate for their Conduct, they will infallibly *pass by* you.

Your next Paragraph begins, "I now "*descend* at once into the Subject;" and it must be confessed by your greatest Enemies, that you are excellent in the Art of *Sinking*; you will soon be at the very Bottom of the Bathos. You then vouchsafe to tell us great Secrets; "that the present War was "just and necessary." But was it for that Reason just and necessary that it should be conducted in this insufficient and pernicious Manner? You add, "that the People "in general, and the commercial Part more "especially, were unanimous and clamorous

" for it." Are they not as clamorous and unanimous againſt its being conducted as it has been? " That the Current of Parliament " ran violently that Way alſo." It may run as violent againſt the M——r probably this Winter; or will that juſtify male Adminiſtration? " And, laſtly, the Adminiſtration " would have been looked upon as Enemies, " had they retarded this favourite Meaſure." Very true; and therefore you infer they are exempt from all Faults in having been guilty of male Conduct. You then add, " they ſup- " ported what was begun with all the Ala- " crity of Preparation." Tho' this is not true; or, if it was, not to be placed to their Merit; you ſhall have that granted too, if you will; the next Sentence will be ſufficient for me. " And *all the Vigour of Execution.*" Here you and I muſt debate that Matter a little, and then, as you ſay, " let the Facts, for " thoſe alone are Evidence, prove this Aſſer- " tion in Detail."

LET me aſk you then, what are the Effects of this Vigour of Execution? Was it the *Loſs* of *Minorca?* Was it the Loſs of *Oſwego?* Was it the *ill ſtationed* Cruiſe of Mr. *Boſcawen* and Mr. *Holbourne*, or *that* of Mr. *Hawke?* There remains then nothing but the

the taking the little Isle of *Chaussée*, the Product of all this Vigour of Execution, and this great Conquest may possibly escape the Knowledge of Posterity, as it has not been enter'd into the *Gazette*, so remarkable at present for authentic Intelligence.

You then talk " of the Duke *de Mire-*
" *poix*'s Professions of sincere Desire to ad-
" just all Disputes subsisting in *America*, and
" forget the Breach of Honour by our M—r;
" of the *French* having dispatch'd Orders for
" arming a considerable Fleet; their myste-
" rious and extraordinary Step, and our
" general Alarm, which made it indispensa-
" bly necessary for the King to equip a Fleet
" which might frustrate any Attempts of
" *France*, and protect at the same time the
" *British* Rights and Dominions." And then roundly add, " *This was done.*" What was done? Was a Fleet equipt which might *frustrate* the *Attempts* of *France* and *protect* the *British* Rights and Dominions? How will you justify the M——e M———r then in not effectuating what you confess to have been in his Power by Means of this Fleet? for can you point out one *French* Attempt that has been frustrated? Is it in *America?* The *French* succeed but too well on that Continent,

as the Loſs of our Ships on the Lake *Ontario*, the Demolition of our Forts, the taking our Army Priſoners, and the reducing Lord *Loudon* to act on the Defenſive, are too melancholy Proofs. Is it in *Europe?* The entire Loſs of *Minorca* is a fatal Demonſtration to the contrary. Where then are our Dominions protected? Not in the *American* Iſlands, theſe, particularly *Jamaica*, every Man knows is, by the neglect of a proper Squadron to defend it, in hourly Danger from the ſuperior Fleet and Force of our Enemies in thoſe Parts.

WHAT a Power of Face you muſt be bleſſed with, who dare to *defend* the M——rs, after every Attempt of theirs offenſive and defenſive has miſcarried! And you have aſſerted, that a Fleet was prepared which might fruſtrate the Attemps of *France*, and protect the Dominions of *England*. Why were they not defended? How greatly the M——rs are obliged to you for this excellent Defence of their Conduct! What Place will you chooſe?

YOU then tell us of *Boſcawen*'s and *Holbourne*'s ſailing, of *Macnamara*'s ſailing and returning, and then beg to be indulged in two Remarks, both which I beg to be in-

indulged in examining. You ſay, " Every " Child in Politics knows, that after receiv- " ing Orders as to the Nature of the Service " he is to be employed in, and as to the " *general* Deſtination, the commanding Of- " ficer in all very diſtant Expeditions, is and " muſt be intruſted with a diſcretionary " Power; firſt to chooſe ſuch particular " Stations as may be moſt proper to effect " the Buſineſs intended, and to vary them " afterwards, according as different Exi- " gencies ariſe, or as the earlieſt Intelligence " he can obtain may render it adviſeable."

Now, Sir, if you mean by general Deſtination a Space to cruize in, unlimited by Orders, you are *worſe* than a Boy in Politics; if this were permitted to an Admiral, how could the Admiralty know where to ſend him Intelligence on particular Emergencies? or how could a Commander be called to Account for any Miſcarriage in miſſing the Enemy's Fleet, if ſome private Inclination ſhould prevail on him to cruize where the Enemy was *not* like to paſs? he cannot be guilty of breaking Orders on that Head, when none are given him. Now, Sir, no Admiral is ever intruſted with diſcretionary Power to chooſe his Stations, or to vary them, but as

he receives Intelligence from the Admiralty. All Orders are given to cruize between two ſpecified Latitudes and two Longitudes, as near as they can obſerve the Latter; or ſo many Leagues to Eaſtward, Weſtward, or ſome other bearing from a Cape of Land or Sea Coaſt; and no Indulgence is ever given to depart from the Extremes of this Station, but on abſolute Neceſſity. Thus there is no Diſtinction to be made between general and particular Orders, and all the diſcretionary Part given to the Admiral is the Choice between the Extremes. And in this manner the Orders were given to Mr. *Boſcawen* and to Mr. *Hawke*; and therefore you cannot avail yourſelf of this evaſive Falſhood to defend the M———r: for unleſs you can prove that either of theſe Gentlemen have exceeded the Limits given them in their Orders, the whole Charge ſtill reſts on the M——e M——r, who only has *diſcretionary* Power, with *which* the preſent Head of the Ad———y is remarkably endowed, to chooſe their Stations, and who is ſuppoſed beſt to underſtand in what manner the Service that Commanders are ſent upon is to be accompliſhed. Then you add, "That the Merchants muſt "be ſenſible, that to lay before the Public "Inſtructions of ſuch a Nature, even were

"it

" it in your Power ſo to do, is a Step of too " delicate a Nature for any private Man to " take, however *juſt* they may be in them- " ſelves, however warranted by the Laws of " *Reaſon* and *Self-defence*, *the War that oc-* " *caſioned them is ſtill carrying on.*" Admirable indeed, thoſe Inſtructions *juſt* in themſelves, *warranted* by *Reaſon* and *Self-defence*, are to be *concealed* becauſe we are ſtill at *war*.

Now declare, for once, *honeſtly* if you can, Do you believe that theſe juſt and reaſonable Inſtructions by being publiſhed can diſcover any thing which can affect the Succeſs of Mr. *Boſcawen*'s Cruize, which has been finiſhed more than a Year ſince? Do you believe that the *Reaſon* and *Juſtice* of them would excite other Nations to join our Enemies? Do you think they would irritate the *French*, and ſo create, as it were, a double War by the increaſed Violence? Do you imagine the People of *England* would be inflamed againſt the M——r for having deſtin'd the Fleets with *Juſtice* and *Reaſon* and for *Self-defence*? Can the M——rs then whom you are defending be hurt by publiſhing ſuch Inſtructions? Would they be ſilent if the Diſcovery of ſuch Secrets could ſerve them in

their preſent Perils? Tell me then, what is this pretended Prudence and Neceſſity of Concealment more than a wretched Evaſion to avoid the attempting to juſtify that which you know is impoſſible to be ſupported?

YOUR next Remark is extremely ſhrewd indeed; that "whenever the Adminiſtration "makes uſe of Means duly proportion'd to "the End propoſed, and chooſes for obtain-"ing ſuch End, Men of acknowledged Abi-"lities in their Profeſſion, fully inſtructed and "impowered to act, they have done their "Duty." And I ſuppoſe you will allow alſo, that when ſuch *Men* have *not* been *choſen*, and *ſuch* things *not done*, that then the M——r has *not done* his *Duty*.

TELL me, was Mr. *Braddock* acknowledged to poſſeſs Abilities for a General, who had never commanded at any one Place; or, as I have been inform'd, ſeen any one Action? Was Mr. *S——y*, bred to the Law, a proper Perſon to be put at the Head of an Army? Here, at leaſt, the M——r fail'd in his Choice of Men; you ſhall ſee how he did in Means, immediately.

YOU

You then declaim very prettily indeed, and tell us a vaſt Secret; "that no Miniſter "was ever Maſter of Events;" and then, with an Apology for the *Triteneſs* of the Obſervation, tho' I believe it is the firſt Time it has ever been made; "That the *Sea* conti-"nues the *moſt* inconſtant of all the Ele-"ments." You have forgotten the *Air*, out of which the Winds are formed. Then you ſay, "If our Vice-Admiral could not inter-"cept the whole *French* Fleet, either in its "going to *America* or returning, is the *At-"lantic* no wider than the Channel between "*Dover* and *Calais?*" Had the Ocean been as wide as the Univerſe, it would have been of no Effect to prevent their being taken is evident from your own Account: becauſe you ſay, "the two Fleets ſaw and fell "in with each other more than once." That Storms did not vex our Fleet, or prevent theirs from being ſeen, you and the Account from the Admiral confirm, who mentions nothing of that Nature; and the Nights in that Part of the World are ſo ſhort at that Time of the Year, that no Fleet can ſail thro' another between Sun-ſet and Sun-riſing, ſo as to be out of Sight, or out of Reach of it in the Morning. Their Eſcape is to be placed

to

to that Account, to which the Admiral aſcribes it, "the Fog prevented him." A Fog continuing a Month, perhaps two, as effectually conceiling Ships as the darkeſt Night: Theſe Fogs in that Part of the World are not uncertain Meteors, which come and go at no ſettled Time, as in this Iſland; but as regular in thoſe Months in which the *French* Fleet paſt thoſe Parts, as the Monſoons or trade Winds in other Latitudes; and as well known ſo to be by all Seamen who underſtand the Nature of their Profeſſion. Why then was our Fleet ſent to meet that of the Enemy in thoſe Seas? Was it thro' Ignorance or Deſign in the M——r? Is this becoming the Knowledge or Integrity which ought to reſide in the Head of the *A*———? Is there a Defence for this Behaviour concealed amongſt your *warrantable*, *juſt*, and *reaſonable* Inſtructions? And here I cannot avoid remarking your Deſign of ſaying what has been already confuted in Relation to the Orders given by the *A*———*y* to the commanding Officers; it was viſibly to remove the Blame of chooſing this miſtaken Station from the M——e M——r, and to lay it on the Admiral, to ſave the Guilty by accuſing the Innocent. Is this an Action becoming the Man who

who ſets out with ſaying, he *has no Cauſe to ſerve but that of Truth and his Country.*

AFTER this, you give an Account of taking two *French* Ships, and ſay nothing of loſing one of our own; of taking eight Companies of *French* Soldiers, and ſeven thouſand ſix hundred Pounds ſterling of their Money. And then inſtance a *ſecond Proof* of the wrong Deſtination of this Fleet, by the *Fogs* ſaving Monſieur *de la Mothe* in his going into the Gulph of St. *Lawrence*; after which you add, that we buried upwards of two thouſand Sailors in this *well* appointed Cruize; you now tell us that the *French* Squadron eſcaped Mr. *Holbourne* through the Streights of *Belleiſle*, an unfrequented and hazardous Navigation, which had never before been attempted by any *Fleet* or *Squadron* of Ships: But had it not by ſingle Ships? Now let me ſuppoſe you ſaw another Reaſoner as clear headed as yourſelf, paſs thro' a Door, would not you conclude that twenty ſuch clever Fellows might paſs the ſame Way one after another? The M——e M——r ought to have known, in conſequence of the Duty of his high Commiſſion, that ſingle Ships of War had paſt that Way; and he *ought* to have had Underſtanding enough alſo, to have in-

fer'd that twenty might have done it for the ſame Reaſon. For Ships, tho' in a Squadron, are not obliged to ſail a-breſt. But however, tho' their Ships eſcaped Mr. *Holbourne*, you give us great Comfort in aſſuring us he paid them going in another Way; he chaced *one* that could *not* be overtaken; and the *Edenburgh*, *Dunkirk*, and *Norwich* purſued two others which *were* not to be overtaken. Indeed you ſay, "the *Dunkirk* came near "them, but directly to Windward;" Which was to Windward, the *Dunkirk* or the *French*, for you don't determine? If the *Dunkirk*, then, had ſhe continued the Purſuit with the two others, probably the *French* had been taken by ſailing before the Wind; and if they had been purſued and overtaken already by turning to Windward, in either Caſe, why were they called off by the Admiral? If this Story be true, I am afraid you have brought Mr. *Holbourne* into a more criminal Behaviour than Mr. *Byng* has been reported to be; becauſe I don't ſee how you will clear the Admiral's Conduct in calling off *three Engliſh-men* of War from engaging with *two French*, when they were ſo near as to be all in Sight of each other; and the *Engliſh* had overtaken the *French* in the Chace. Are not three *Engliſh* Ships of War a Match for two *French?*

I hope you will reaſon the ſame in the Caſe of Mr. *Byng*; as to be ſure *this* is ſaid for the Sake of *Truth*, and not ſerving any Cauſe but that of *your Country*. The *French* Attempts then, were not fruſtrated by this *Expedition*; and now the whole Advantage reaped from this expenſive Equipment, when it comes to be ſum'd up together, was *taking* two *French* Ships, and *loſing* one of *our own*; *taking a thouſand* Frenchmen *Priſoners*, and *burying* near *three thouſand Engliſhmen*, taking ſeven thouſand ſix hundred Pounds of *French* Money; and ſpending perhaps, half a Million of this Nation's; *chacing* three *Frenchmen* of War, and *taking never a one* of them. Ample Satisfaction for ſo expenſive an Expedition, and a thorough Juſtification of the M——r. Now, Sir, I think your plain Deduction of Facts will not ſerve the Purpoſe of vindicating the M——e M——r; and when you ſay that *nothing* has been *kept back* from our View, you *forget* yourſelf; an unlucky Circumſtance for a Man who treats *Truth* as you do. Have not you kept back the *reaſonable and juſt Inſtructions?* And when you ſay *nothing* has been brought *too forward*, what think you of your Endeavours to throw the *Blame* of an *ill judged Station* on Admiral

Boſcawen, and your puffing about *Holbourne's Chaces*; and here you exclaim, " That you " ſhould rank yourſelf amongſt the worſt of " Mankind, as not deſerving the common " Benefits of Air and Water, much leſs the " Privileges of a Free *Briton*, if from Levi- " ty or Malice you ſhould debaſe your Pen ſo " far as to unſettle the Affections of your Fel- " low-ſubjects, by ſpreading Lies of Men " merely becauſe they are Miniſters, or to " enforce the Calamities of your Country " merely to ſhew your Talent in Ridicule and " Ribaldry."

Now, Sir, as to the Lies that have been told by me, according to your Account, does not the contrary of that pretty plainly appear at preſent, and that Imputation revert doubly upon you? And as to your lying through *Malice or Levity*, probably you excuſe yourſelf by ſaying, you are *paid* for it; then tell me, which deſerves the Interdiction of Fire and Water, he who lies to ſupport a ruinous M———r againſt the public *Voice* of his *Country*, and criminates the *Innocent* to excuſe the *Guilty*; he who *miſrepreſents* and *falſifies* through the whole, becauſe he is defending an *iniquitous Ad———n*, and attempts

tempts to perſuade the moſt reſpectable Body of Men, the Merchants of *London*, that their *Deſtroyers* are their *Friends*; or I, who having thus far juſtified all I have written; who, by ſpeaking Truth, have laid open the nefarious Ways by which my Country has been almoſt undone by the moſt profligate of Men, and attempted, at leaſt, the Preſerſervation of our little remaining Liberty and Conſtitution, by the very Letter which you wiſh to condemn.

WHOM then ought the People of *England* now to avoid? Againſt the Infuſion of whoſe Writings ſhould they guard themſelves? Which of us is moſt probably the Miſcreant? Who will *betray his Friend* or *aſſaſſinate his Father*, he who endeavours to *ſave* his *Country* from the Hands of its Deſtroyers; or he who has given a Demonſtration that he is *prepared* for any kind of *Iniquity*, by daring to deceive his Countrymen into a Belief that thoſe who have brought this Nation to the Threſhold of *Perdition*, are yet a blameleſs Set of *Men*, in order that they may be permitted to *fill* the Meaſure of *their Iniquity* and *our Ruin*, and *cloſe* eternally the Door upon our *Liberties*, *Privileges*, and *Conſtitution*; no Man ever was or ought to be accounted

honeſt

honeſt who defends the Enemies of his *Country*, *Hic niger eſt hunc tu* Britanne *caveto.*

YOUR next Paragraph begins with ſaying, " our Object was the intercepting of the " *French* Fleet;" you miſs'd it then; which is followed by an Aſſertion equally true as the former is juſt, " the ſame Plan which " had ſucceeded ſo well in the laſt War was " purſued in this." Was there a Fleet ſent to cruize on the Banks of *Newfoundland* in the foggy Months, or was the *Mediterranean* left without a ſufficient naval Defence for *Minorca* and *Gibraltar* during the laſt War? What Regard is to be paid to ſuch *hard faced* Writers, who dare to contradict the united Knowledge of all *England?* You then ſay, " That the ſame Officers who had diſtin- " guiſhed themſelves then were employed " now;" and undoubtedly they would have rendered their Country equal Service at this Time, if the ſame Men had preſided at the Head of the Ad——y and deſtin'd the Stations of our Ships which did the laſt War; and then you lug in, by way of palliative Cant, the Uncertainty of Iſſues, and their being in the Hands of Providence, as a Screen for the M——e M——r. Are you ignorant that it is the certain Rule of Provi-

Providence, tho' Ignorance and Folly may at firſt ſucceed, that good Senſe ſhall ſoon prevail? And ſurely our Misfortunes have been long enough continued to prove the Superiority of good Senſe in our M—rs, if they are poſſeſs'd with that neceſſary Qualification, and I know of no Intervention of Providence in Favour of our *Enemies* or againſt *us*, which can countenance your unnatural Search of this Obſervation in their Favour, unleſs you call the Ignorance or Perfidy of the M——r an Intervention of Providence in Favour of our Enemies, and to our own Ruin.

YOUR next Article is the Praiſe of the Adminiſtration for taking *French* Effects and *French* Sailors before the War was declared; an Action which all *Europe* has beheld with *Horror*, and ruin'd our Character of *Humanity* in every State of it; will the Deſign of preventing the *French*, in a Time of *Peace*, from availing themſelves of their *own* Subjects, juſtify our confining their Sailors in loathſome Dungeons, half ſtarved by the cruel Method, connived at by the M——r, of letting out the Privilege of feeding them from one to another, till from Sixpence, allow'd by the Government, it becomes probably Threepence only to him who provides for the unhappy Priſoner,

by

by which Means the Price is reduced ſo low, their Food is ſcarce better than Poiſon: this together with cloſe Confinement and putrid Air finiſhes the Lives and Miſeries of innocent Men. Are Politics and Mercy ſuch utter Strangers, that in Peace even theſe Cruelties cannot be prevented? Are the M——rs of ſuch Crimes to be applauded for their Actions? particularly as you have juſtified the *French*, by mentioning the *Miſſiſſipi* Overture of the Quaker, in guarding themſelves from ſult on that Side; and, I think, when Mr. *Waſhington* ſigned thoſe Articles which denominate him an Aſſaſſin, he proved himſelf the Aggreſſor. Beſides is it credible that the confining *eight* thouſand out of *eighty* thouſand regiſtered *Seamen*, and being the Bane of half of them, can have prevented an *Invaſion* from *France*. And though you are pleaſed to ſay, that thoſe who ridiculed the Attempt, would have been the firſt to tremble at it; yet believe me, there is one Symptom of Cowardice which *you* have given, and *they* not, the Approbation of *Cruelty*. How ſcrupulouſly you obey the Dictates of that Maſter, which you pretend to preach, in loving your Enemies, when you approve of Barbarity againſt thoſe who were *not* ſo at that Time. But what Wonder is it, that a Man

Man who has diſclaimed all Affection for his Country, by defending the Iniquity of M—rs, her greateſt Enemies, ſhould renounce the Feelings of *Humanity* and the Mandates of his *God*. When you were attempting to juſtify this Meaſure, which has branded the *Engliſh* Nation, by the Crimes of their M—r, with Piracy, through all the States of *Europe*, would you have perſiſted, had the following manner of thinking enter'd your Imagination? that the M——r by conſenting to a Militia almoſt two Years paſt, might by that Means have protected the Kingdom from all Danger of Invaſion, have then declared War againſt *France*, and by rendering our Troops uſeleſs at home, ſent them immediately to attack *Quebec* ſupported by a Squadron of our Navy? Theſe, joined by the *Americans*, would, in the Condition that City then ſtood, have rendered all *Canada* no difficult Conqueſt. Whilſt *Minorca* might have been render'd impregnably in our Poſſeſſion by another Part of the Fleet and Soldiery; thus *France* might have been completely humbled, at half the Expence which has been already ſo fruitleſly and fatally waſted, and of this the *French* were not a little afraid. In this manner Men of underſtanding would have behaved, inſtead of which the M———rs,

juſtly afraid of a People they have ſo long and ſo egregiouſly injured, withheld Arms from their Hands, kept too many of the Navy and Troops at home, half-ruin'd *America*, by permitting the *French* to land their Forces in *Canada*; ſuffered *Quebec* to be placed in Safety, by their ſending Succours; and loſt that important Iſland of *Minorca*, by the ſame Management; all this while chearing themſelves with the Thoughts of acting like Pirates, and doing that, which though it injured a few of the *private Subjects* of *France*, effected almoſt nothing againſt it as a Nation; for what is the Value of all that has been taken in *three hundred Ships*, when conſidered as a national Loſs? How many Millions have we ſpent to obtain that Trifle? If the M———rs had been determined to act like Pirates, they ſhould have imitated the *ſuperb Thieving* of the King of *Pruſſia* in invading *Saxony*, and not the mean-ſpirited Pilferers on the Highway. But by their Behaviour in this Particular they have branded this Nation with the Stigmata of Inhumanity and Piracy, as they had before with that of Folly, by our ſuffering the Imbecillity and Profligacy of their Adminiſtration. And yet ſuch Men *you* have the Hardineſs to defend.

THE

THE next Aſſertion which you make is as replete with *Truth* as the former is with *Humanity*, you ſay, " It cannot be denied, while " our own Trade never was better nor more " generally protected in any Period during " a War, the Trade of our Enemies never " ſuffered more at the ſame Time." You mean, I ſuppoſe, when we took the *French* and they return'd, or did not take, our Ships. " The Conſequence of which is, that the " homeward bound Ships from the *French* " Settlements are from 40 to 55 *per Cent.*" This thoſe very Merchants to whom you write will deny; they know that 40 Guineas *per Cent.* is the higheſt which has been given for the Inſurance of *French* Merchandize from thoſe Parts; 10 and 12 *per Cent.* are things of no Conſideration, and indeed ought not to be to a Man determined, as you are, *per fas et nefas*, to vindicate a ruinous M——r.

THOSE very Merchants alſo to whom you write, will inform you, that the contrary of this Attention to the protecting our Trade is true, and that, when they petition'd for a ſtronger Convoy for their Ships to our Sugar Iſlands, through Apprehenſion of *Perrier de Salvert*'s ſuperior Squadron, they were denied, and anſwer'd, that *Salvert*'s Squadron was

greatly magnified. They know alſo that *Jamaica* as ſhamefully open to the hourly Inv ſion of the *French*, thro' Neglect of a ſufficient Squadron; and that the Trade of the other Iſlands is in the ſame ruinous Condition, from a ſimilar Inattention; and the Neglect, if it deſerves no worſe Appellation, of *Minorca*, is that a Proof of M——l Attention to the Care of *Engliſh* Commerce? Tarry till next Spring, and then decide whoſe Commerce has ſuffer'd moſt, that of the *French* or that of *England*; unleſs, happily, ſome ſuperior Underſtanding preſides over the Affairs of this Kingdom, and prevents the approaching Miſchief.

You then recount what Squadrons have been fitted out and commanded by *Boſcawen*, *Hawke*, *Byng*, *Oſborne*, *Hawke* again, and laſtly *Byng*, once more, for the *Mediterranean*; what is the ſhameful Hiſtory of theſe Fleets? Have not the Cruiſes of all been render'd ineffectual by their Inſufficiency and the ill-judged Stations to which they have been deſtined? what Merit is there in fitting out Navies, when ſuch unparallel'd Imbecillity renders the whole Effect abortive? You then add, " That much licentious Invective has " been thrown out, at random, on that To-

" pic

" pic by thoſe who of all Men knew the " leaſt of what they were to condemn or ap- " prove." We ſhall ſoon diſcern whether you are not more ignorant than thoſe you dare to condemn: You then tell us, " This Squadron " was not only deſign'd to intercept *Du Guay*, " but even *La Mothe* and *Salvert*; and that " *Du Guay*'s going from *Liſbon* to *Cadiz*, " render'd the Conjecture extremely proba- " ble, that he was to join thoſe other Squa- " drons in their Return, at ſome fix'd Ren- " dezvous, and by that Means ſecure their " ſafe Entry into *France*." Now to whom was this *extremely* probable? Was it to the M——e M———r? Do you ſpeak this from Authority alſo? If you do, you and that ſagacious Head are the only two to whom it has ever appeared *barely* probable; and if your Ignorance of Geography did not ſurpaſs every thing that can be imagined, if you knew Land from Sea, in the Map, you could not have uttered ſuch things. You ſay, *Du Guay* went from *Liſbon* to *Cadiz* in order to join *La Mothe* and *Salvert*; that is, *he* did as you have done in this Defence, he went entirely out of his Way. *Louiſbourgh* lies about the Latitude of 46, *Breſt* of 48, the Courſe from *Louiſbourgh* then from this laſt named City is Eaſt a little Northerly; *Du*

Guay

Guay at *Liſbon*, about the Latitude 39, 136 Leagues diſtant from the Courſe to *Breſt* from *Louiſbourgh*, not being ſufficiently out of the Way, however ſails to *Cadiz*, which is more than twenty Leagues farther out of the Road in Latitude, and almoſt as much in Longitude, with Deſign to meet *La Mothe* and *Salvert*: was there ever a Man who pretended to write upon naval Expeditions ſo ignorant of the Map? But then to mend this Matter, and juſtify your M——e M———r, you ſay, Mr. *Hawke* was deſtin'd to cruiſe where he did, to intercept them all; and if you ſpeak this from authentic Accounts alſo, you have proved your M———r even more ignorant than he was conceived to be before, a thing which moſt People thought impoſſible; becauſe Mr. *Hawke* being ſtation'd off Cape *Finiſterre*, about the Latitude 43, was five Degrees, that is reckoning only ſixty Miles to a Degree, a hundred Leagues ſouth of the Courſe from *Louiſbourgh* to *Breſt*; if then the M——e M——r had ſuggeſted a Rendezvous of *Du Guay* and the *Louiſbourgh* Squadrons, and therefore ſtation'd Mr. *Hawke* off the Cape, does he imagine that *Du Guay*, who muſt know of *Hawke*'s Station, would not have inform'd thoſe of it whom he was appointed to meet, and have avoided,

as

as he did alone, that Fleet under Mr. *Hawke?* You are excellent in the Science of Defence. Have not you juſtified this Station of Mr. *Hawke* to Admiration, by this New Light you have thrown upon it? How reaſonable it is to admire both the M——e M——r and *yourſelf*, the more one is let into the *Knowledge* of *you*. But I aſk Pardon for omitting to take notice that *one* Ship of the *Canada* Squadron was taken (the *Iriſh* way) by being *not* taken at all, for ſhe ſunk; another of greatly *ſuperior* Force was *engaged* by *one* of our cruiſing *Frigates*, the *Frenchman* was finely paid going I warrant you; and a *Third* eſcaped by our Ship that chaced carrying away her Topmaſt; and you might have added, ſo did all the reſt by the wrong Station of our Fleet by the M——e M——r, and not by Mr. *Hawke*; this would have made a round Account of it. Now, pray who knows moſt of what he has been talking, you in this Letter, or I in the Fourth to the People of *England?*

You now begin to improve greatly upon our Hands, and tell us, " Theſe different " and neceſſary Steps, on the Part of *Great* " *Britain*, produced, and could not fail of " producing, in the *French* an *ardent Deſire*

" of

" of *Revenge.*" What, for eſcaping our Squadron, and for ſucceeding in their Deſigns in *America?* theſe, indeed, would be ſtrange *Motives* to *Revenge.* You ſhould have ſaid, an *egregious Inclination to laugh*, and a great Contempt for the M—e M—r of *E——d.* Indeed the Treatment of their Fellow-ſubjects, which you ſo *tenderly* approve, did awaken them to the Deſire of taking Revenge. You ſay alſo, that their Squadrons, after only a common Paſſage to and from *America*, could have ſuffered very little; and yet, Page 45, you tell us, that Admiral *Boſcawen* return'd from near the ſame Place, by the ſame Courſe, in a very *bad* Condition, as the ole Squadron had ſuffer'd in their *Maſts, ards, and Rigging, were without Stores*, and loſt *great Numbers* of their *Crews.* Now this would be ſurprizing in any Writer but yourſelf, that the *French* ſhould be *little* the worſe for a Voyage which had almoſt *ruin'd* the *Engliſh*; was this owing to the *French* being *better* Ships than *ours?* To the *Commanders* and Sailors being *better* to command and obey? to the *Forgetfulneſs* of our ſending out *Stores?* were the Winds and Waves in League with *Lewis* XV. againſt *George* II? or what was the Reaſon? Neither of theſe. It was neceſſary in your *Defence* that our Fleet ſhould be

be *ſhattered* and *diſtreſt*, to account for their being kept *at Home* from the *Mediterranean*; and the *French Fleet* in *good* Repair, to keep up in your Writings the *Idea* of the *Probability* and *Terror* of a *French Invaſion*. But, methinks, you might have cover'd this with more Skill, and remembred when you were writing of the *Engliſh*, what you had ſaid of the *French* Fleet. You ought to have a better Memory, according to the old Saying; and conſidering whom you intend to ſupport.

You now grow formidable in your Accounts " of great Bodies of Troops ſpread along " the Coaſts of *Picardy*, *Normandy*, and *Bri-* " *tany*, *threat'ning* a Deſcent on this Iſland, or " *Ireland*." And you judge of the Inclination of the *French* M——y by the *Threats* of the Soldiers. Beſides, whatever Intention there might be againſt *England*, one would imagine that the Troops deſigned againſt *Ireland* would ſcarce have been poſted in *Picardy* and *Normandy*, becauſe the Navigation would have been long, and more apt to be interrupted in ſailing down the Channel, than if they had been embarked at the Ports of *Britany* and *Guienne*; but you are fit to read Lectures in Geography; " and yet we had *repeated* and " *ſure* Intelligence." Of their *Threats* you mean,

it could not be of their coming, I humbly preſume; and indeed I believe, they *never* intended coming, becauſe they *never* did come. But probably, from what appears in your Manner of Reaſoning, you may have concluded they *were* coming, becauſe they did *not* come; and I, that this Alarm was only contrived from a thorough Knowledge of our M——l Capacity, to amuſe us, whilſt they were preparing to invade *Minorca*. You then ſay, "*we* knew," (meaning yourſelf and the Government I preſume, from your repeating, "I ſay that all this was early "known to the Government) that they "meditated an Invaſion of *Minorca*;" and what is execrable in *them*, "after they had "ſolemnly guarantied it to *England* againſt "all Powers whatever?" What againſt *themſelves*, in Time of Hoſtilities? after you had been taking their Ships for many Months, and confining their Subjects to Jails and Death? the Breach of this Guarantying muſt certainly aggravate their Offence; being Guarantees againſt themſelves. Do you conceive the *French* make Treaties to deprive the Nation of its own Powers after War is begun, like our M———rs in that between *H—r*, *E—d*, and with *Pruſſia*; and ſo attack *Minorca* with the left Hand becauſe they are at War with us; and defend it with

the right becauſe they have guarantied it to us? You then add, " In conſequence of the In-
" vaſion being known, the M——r was not
" ſo *ill* inform'd as hundreds, that do *not* be-
" lieve what they publiſh, have dared to
" aſſert."

I am but *one* of theſe hundreds; and upon my Word, *how little* ſoever the others have believed and aſſerted, concerning the M——r's Ignorance of what was paſſing at *Toulon*, I have always *believed* what I have publiſhed; and even, as you ſay, that the M——r was much *better* informed than I have *dared* to *aſſert*. And yet, I truſt *you* will do me the Juſtice to acknowledge that I am not the moſt ſcrupulous in aſſerting what I know to be true; in this one Particular, we *agree* then. But I ſhould imagine the M—e M—r will not *agree* to thank you for what you have *aſſerted* here, becauſe it may create an Enquiry, wherefore, after having received ſuch good Intelligence, he did not, in conſequence of it, proceed to *defeat* the Enemy's Deſign at *Toulon?* Why a Fleet was not *ſooner* ſent into the *Mediterranean*, and a *ſtronger* after it had been ſo *long* delay'd? Why, when this M——e M——r knew that *twelve* were equiping at *Toulon*, he aſſured Mr. *Byng* that

five Ships only would oppoſe him, and no more than *ſeven* could be brought to Sea. Had not you better adhere to the Ignorance of the M——r for his Defence, and prove from the whole Tenor of his Proceedings, that he was *non compos mentis*; and therefore, tho' a proper *Object* of national Enquiry, not an *Object* of national Puniſhment? this may ſave his Head at leaſt. Take my Word, the moſt convincing Arguments in his Favour, are to be drawn from this Side; and I think, (tho' probably you may ſuſpect the Advice as coming from me) that a *Pamphlet* full as well written as this I am examining, would be very acceptable to the Public, and advantageous to the Cauſe of the M——r you are defending.

But alas, here again you grow extremely diſcreet, and whip yourſelf under a Secret, as a Mole does under Ground, becauſe his Eyes cannot bear the Light of Heaven, any more than yours the View of Truth. You tell us four Months after *Minorca* is taken, it would be *premature* and *hazardous* to expoſe ſuch Intelligence; and therefore, leſt *Minorca* ſhould be taken, twice, I ſuppoſe you meant prudently to conceal———what every one ſees, and the Reaſon for ſo doing; it makes againſt your M——e M——r. " This Declaration,

" ration, you ſay, would be to copy after the " pernicious Example of ſome other Writers, " who, while they pretend to inform us, afford " real and *dangerous* Information only to our " *Enemies*." And I ſuppoſe you would have them afford *dangerous* Information to our *Friends* only, as you have done, in this Defence, to your Friend the M—e M——r. It is impoſſible to omit obſerving how much your Secrets reſemble thoſe of him you would defend. In the Beginning of the War, he was very ſecret alſo, when nothing was to be revealed. " Let it ſuffice then, you ſub- " join, for the preſent to ſay, that by a Let- " ter from abroad, dated the 24th of *Dec.* " you accidentally read in the Original, it " appeared the *French* were then going upon " an Equipment of a Squadron at *Toulon*, and " that this Squadron was to consiſt of *twelve* " Ships of the Line; thoſe Ships were in effect " got ready in about *two* Months after the " Intelligence came; and ſailed to ſupport " the Attack upon *Minorca*, where they ar- " rived the 18th of *April*." And in this Place I find you are as good an Arithmetician as Geographer; from the 14th of *December* to the 14th of *February* makes two Months; this Fleet then from *Toulon* was two Months at Sea, becauſe it did not arrive at *Minorca* till

till the 18th of *April*, a long Voyage for ſo ſhort a Diſtance; or it did *not* ſail till the 14th of *April*, and was but four Days; either you do not know that from the 14th of *December* to the 14th of *April* is four Months, or you have ſaid what all *Europe* knows to be falſe, take which you pleaſe, the Credit of the Ignorance or of the Falſhood, or if you like both take them, indeed they are not equal to your Deſerts. Now why was this Diſcovery (by means of this early Intelligence) not attended to? Did the Letter come through *your* Hands to the M———r? And did *he* know your Love of *Veracity* at that time as well as *I* do at preſent, and therefore believe that nothing *true* could come from *you?* plead this in *his* Excuſe next time you write, and this you can aſſert from your own *authentic* Intelligence *within.* You ſee how dangerous it may prove to the Nation to have Men, ſuſpected of being *Liars*, about a M———r.

You now tell us, that " Mr. *Byng* ſet ſail " from St. *Helen*'s *April* the 6th, and arrived " in three and forty Days off *Minorca*;" and then add, " here doubtleſs, it will be, as it " has been often already aſk'd, Why there " was not a Squadron in the *Mediterranean*

" early

" early enough to have blocked up the " *French* Fleet in Port, or to have intercept- " ed it in its Paſſage to *Minorca?* And why " for this *moſt* neceſſary Service it did not " ſail from hence by the Beginning of *March*, " at the lateſt?" This indeed has been aſked and never anſwered; I wiſh you better Luck than thoſe who have preceded you; but we ſhall ſee. You then ſay, " It will be aſked again, " why this Squadron, even when join'd with " the three already in thoſe Seas, was ſupe- " rior in *Number* to the *French* Ships by *only* " *one* Ship of the Line?" Indeed this Queſtion will never be aſk'd; it may be enquired, why the *Engliſh* Fleet was *one* inferior? *Eleven* to twelve *French* Ships of the *Line*, as the *Deptford* and *Portland* being but 48 Gun Ships, are never reckon'd of the Line. Hence it appears, Sir, you either do not know that *twelve French* Ships are more than *eleven Engliſh*, or what conſtitutes a *Line* of Battle Ship; and thus you exhibit another Proof of your Skill in Arithmetic, or of your Knowledge in naval Affairs. Then you add, " I " have ſtated the Queſtions fairly, Gentle- " men, and I will anſwer them with the " ſtricteſt Truth." Indeed you have miſtaken already in the ſtating, by two Ships; and you will *not* anſwer with the ſtricteſt

Regard

Regard to *Truth*, as you ſhall ſee immediately.

To do this effectually you ſay, " It is " proper to take a Review of the State of our " Navy during the Autumn and Part of the " Winter: in theſe Months thirty-one Ships " of the Line had been employ'd in cruizing " to the Weſtward;" to which you ſhould have added *uſeleſsly*. Thus the Fleet of *England*, once ſo Formidable, became an unavailing Expence to this Nation, and the Object of Ridicule in the Eyes of our Enemies; returning as you confeſs ſhatter'd, diſtreſs'd, diſabled, during which time *many hundred* Men, braver than himſelf, were alſo ſacrificed by the ſiniſter Conduct, or from ſome worſe Motive, of *one* pernicious Man.

You then continue, " Vice Admiral *Boſ-* " *cawen*, with the Ships under his Com- " mand, to the Number of thirteen of the " Line, return'd from North *America* about " the Middle of *November*." (Now I could tell you a Reaſon for this his Delay; but I am determined once in my Life, to be as *ſe-* *cret* as you.) " Moſt of theſe were in bad " Condition, had ſuffered greatly in Maſts, " Yards, Rigging; and the whole Squadron " was

" was quite bare of Stores, and greatly di-
" miniſhed in their Compliments of Men,
" by Death and Diſeaſe." This is not yet quite bad enough, " the laſt Winter was di-
" ſtinguiſhed by being the moſt hard-hearted
" and cruel, the moſt ſtormy and turbulent
" under every Appearance, till near the End
" of *January*, that has been known theſe 40
" Years; theſe inevitable Accidents greatly
" retarded the Cure of the ſick Men, as well
" as the refitting our Ships again for Ser-
" vice." Theſe Accidents indeed, had the Ships been at Sea, would have been very great Obſtructions to their being refitted; but how the high Winds and high Waves at *Sea* ſhould retard the refitting of Ships in *Chatham*, *Portſmouth*, and *Plymouth* Docks, is not ſo eaſily to be comprehended; or how the Winds and Waves ſhould affect the Sailors Health on Shore. You then tell " us, that thoſe that were *dead*, *run away*,
" and *render'd unfit for Duty*, had diminiſh'd
" the Number ſo greatly that even unuſual
" Means could not ſupply the Navy." And here you ſhould have added, *theſe Things were owing* to the Want of Ventilators and of good Proviſions on board, and to that inhuman Tyranny of forcing a liberal Race of Men from

 their

their Families, which are dear to them, bound like Felons.

HOWEVER, it ſeems, notwithſtanding this *Train* of unhappy Circumſtances, twenty-five Ships of the Line, and three for Convoys, in all twenty-eight, were ready by the Middle of *January*; thirteen of theſe ſailed *January* the 30th, and return'd in ſixteen Days. Now, Sir, as you are pleaſed to tell us, that you ſaw a Letter dated on the 24th of *December*, which I conclude came to hand before the thirtieth of *January*, Why was that Fleet of Mr. *Oſbourne*'s not ſent into the *Mediterranean*, after having convoyed the Ships to the Place he left them? And why was that *moſt* neceſſary Service, as you term it, at that time neglected? For as thoſe Ships could be ſpared to convoy a Fleet for ſixteen Days, notwithſtanding the dread of an Invaſion, could they not have been ſent to ſave *Minorca?* Twenty-eight were ready, ſhould not the three that went as Convoys have been detained, becauſe the more important Service ought to ſuperſede the leſs; the M———r then, if an Invaſion was apprehended, acted weakly to deprive us of the Uſe of that Fleet for ſixteen Days, during which time it might have been carried into Action; or if he was under

under no Dread of that Kind, he behaved with great Imbecillity, or ſomething more criminal, in not ſending it to *Minorca*.

You then inform us, that Sir *Edward Hawke*, with fourteen Ships of the Line, ſet ſail about the Middle of *March*, to cruiſe off of *Breſt*; you then ſubjoin, "Now it appears, by a true State of our Fleet, that not "fewer than forty-nine Ships were employed at the Beginning of this Month (*March*) "for indiſpenſible Home-ſervices;" whereof it ſeems but *eighteen* were of the *Line*; conſequently, however ſhowy the Number Forty-nine may appear, no more than eighteen ought to be deducted from the whole Number of the Line in Commiſſion. Now where were the reſt, and what Truth is there in this Expedition of fitting out Ships attributed to him whom you would defend, when eighteen of the Line only were ready for Sea. You tell us after this, "that there remained in Port, *not under Or-*"*ders to proceed to Sea*, forty-ſix Ships of "the Line." And how many under *Orders* to proceed to Sea you do not chooſe to mention. "Of theſe, twenty were only in "a Condition for Service, had their due Num-"bers of Men been complete: but in theſe

" they were deficient by Two thouſand Two
" hundred and Fifty-ſix. The Comple-
" ments of the other twenty-ſix Ships a-
" mounted to Thirteen thouſand Seven hun-
" dred and Forty-eight. But from this Num-
" ber, deducting the Officers, Petty-officers,
" and Servants, there remained only about
" Two thouſand Two hundred Foremaſt-
" men; as there could be no other imme-
" diate Way of furniſhing out the Comple-
" ments of the twenty Ships, ready in all
" other Reſpects, it is undeniably evident,
" that the doing ſo, would have ſtripped
" the other twenty-ſix of almoſt all their
" Foremaſt-men.

The firſt Obſervation, on this Part, is that in giving this Detail, you ſay, " That twenty " Ships only could be fitted out, beſides " thoſe under ſailing Orders." Pray let me aſk you, Are ſailing Orders irrevocable? And if they are not, why were they not contradicted for the ſake of that *moſt important Service*, the Preſervation of *Minorca*, which you knew had been menaced ever ſince *December*? Do you act like a Lover of fair Repreſentation? by ſcreening the true Number of *fitted* Ships, in excluding thoſe under ſailing Orders, is not your Deſign ſeen through?

through? And when you aſſert that taking Two thouſand Two hundred Foremaſt-men would deprive the twenty-ſix Ships of *all* their Foremaſt-men, do you not play the Sophiſt moſt egregiouſly? You firſt tell us, to excuſe a Fleet's not being ſent into the *Mediterranean*, that but twenty Ships could immediately be *mann'd*; and exclude thoſe under *ſailing Orders*. And then to excuſe their *not* being completely mann'd, that taking Two thouſand Two hundred Seamen from the other twenty-ſix Ships, would have ſtrip'd them of almoſt *all* their Foremaſt-men.

Now, Sir, according to your own Way of reckoning, that Ships unman'd, tho' in Commiſſion, ſhould never be carried to the Account of active Ships, till their Crews are complete; as there were but Two thouſand Two hundred Seamen amongſt the twenty-ſix, the taking theſe Hands would probably not have render'd any *one* Ship inactive; becauſe, if ſo few Men were equally ſpread amongſt *all* theſe Ships, then, not *one* of them was near ready for the Seas. And therefore, not *one* could be render'd *uſeleſs*; and if theſe Two thouſand Two hundred Seamen had been

diſ-

diſpoſed in a Manner to make whole Crews, then about *three* Ships only could be deprived of their Hands. Thus, inſtead of ſtripping twenty-ſix of their Crews, and thereby rendering ſo many Ships ineffectual, as you would inſinuate, from taking Two thouſand Men; in the firſt Manner, of diſpoſing theſe Men, they would not have deprived the Kingdom of the Uſe of *one* Ship, becauſe none were a Quarter complete in their Crews; and in the ſecond Manner, *three* Ships only could have been render'd inactive, becauſe the whole Amount of Foremaſt-men did not exceed the Crews of ſo many capital Ships. Now at a Moment when all Europe was convinced of the Danger of *Minorca*, and *you* and the M—e M——r had known it, why in the Month of *March*, after repeated Intelligence of the Deſign at *Toulon*, were not thoſe Men taken to complete the Crews of the Ships which wanted them? and why were not the ſailing Orders of thoſe Ships remanded, and others given whereby to have completed a Squadron for the Preſervation of *Mahon?* This would effectually have prevented the whole Scheme of attacking *Minorca*. *Now, Sir, need I intreat your ſerious Attention to theſe Particulars?*

lars? is not what you have adopted, taken from uncertain Memoirs and deceitful Suggeſtions?

BESIDES what has been already ſaid, there is yet another Reaſon which will perfectly efface all the palliative Defence, that you have made. Even ſuppoſing that the Ships were ſo few as you affirm, and were neceſſary at home at that time, whence aroſe this Neceſſity? Was not the P——t of *E——d* then ſitting? Was not a Militia-bill the ardent Purſuit of all who loved their Country? Why then had this Act, ſo neceſſary for the Preſervation of every thing dear to honeſt Men in this Iſland, been rejected? Why had it not been paſs'd the preceding Year? ſince Fleets were then known to be difficultly mann'd, and much Service muſt be inevitably wanted from them, to protect our Trade, Colonies and Poſſeſſions: by this Means all the Men of War almoſt might have been deſtin'd to the *uſeful* Service of their Country, and not rode at *Spithead* in mock Parade for your M——e M——r to go on board, hoiſt his Flag one Day, and then, as Admiral abſent on Leave, receive a thouſand a Year of the Nation's Revenue ever ſince; infamous Inſtance of the Thirſt of Money in *him!* and Profligacy in *thoſe* who acquieſce in

it. Why don't you inſiſt upon it, that *ONE* Family ought to engroſs all the Riches and Honours of the Nation.

Anſwer theſe Things, and then tell me, whether Ignorance or Deſign, Avarice or Patriotiſm influenced moſt in this Conduct. As a farther Pretext for keeping the Fleet at home, again you tell us, "The *French* "Troops were all along their Shore, and "that the ſmall Craft was numerous in their "Ports, and that they had it in their Power "to inſult this Iſland whenever our Inferio-"rity ſhould furniſh them the wiſhed-for "Occaſion."

And here you muſt permit me to tell you, that all the Navy of *England*, deſtined as that was at *Spithead*, cannot prevent a Deſcent on this Iſland coming from *France* in ſmall Craft; and that the ſtationing a Fleet on that Account, on that Spot, is as erroneous and abſurd as the deſtining Mr. *Boſcawen* and Sir *Edward Hawke* has been proved to be. Whatever Invaſion ſhall come in ſmall Craft from *France* will undoubtedly be ſent from the Ports of *Flanders* and *Picardy*, becauſe the Paſſage is much the ſhorteſt between the Coaſts of thoſe Provinces and thoſe of

of *England*, and particularly in the Winter Months, ſmall Craft cannot dare to tranſport Troops where the Diſtance is great; this Craft, rendezvous'd at *Dunkirk*, *Calais*, and *Bologne*, would certainly have waited a fair Wind to come over: the Wind then blowing from South-eaſt to North-eaſt would have landed all this Craft, either on the Shores of *Kent*, *Suſſex*, or *Eſſex*, untouched by any Fleet from *Spithead*, the very Winds which are ſo fair to bring over the *French* being contrary to the Fleet of *Spithead*, if it ſhould attempt ſailing to oppoſe their Landing. To protect the Iſland from a Deſcent of ſmall Craft, a *Spithead* Expedition will avail nothing; and a Squadron before *Breſt* prohibited the coming out of their Ships of War. Thus even had our Danger been ever ſo great, from ſmall Craft, a Fleet kept at home would have been ineffectual. Would not theſe Ships then have proved more ſenſibly employed in defending *Mahon*, which they could have ſaved, than *England* which they could not? If you ſay, that a ſufficient Number of Ships were then in the *Downs* to prevent the Embarkation and Deſcent in ſmall Craft, then thoſe at *Spithead* were ſtill more uſeleſs; if you anſwer there were not, which as that is the *Truth*, probably you will not; then why were thoſe Ships detain'd at *Spithead* which

were neceſſary in the *Downs?* Beſides this, every expert Seaman knows, that Ships of the *Line* are of little Service to prevent a Deſcent made in the Night, in ſmall Craft, and acroſs ſo narrow a Channel, as that between *Flanders*, *Picardy*, and *England*.

Thus, Sir, you have clench'd the Arguments which have been already urged againſt the M——r by your manner of defending him; and when you exhibit your aukward and ill-judged Pathos of throwing a *Veil* over a *Scene in your Eye*, a kind of bunging your Eye, I preſume, you let fly an Arrow againſt the M——r, which wounds more fatally than any thing which has yet parted from me: You ſay, "Had a Deſcent "been then attempted; had they even ſa- "crificed Fifteen or Twenty thouſand Men "in the Attempt, What muſt have been the "Conſequence to this great Capital?" Then you chooſe to *veil* it in your *Eye*, and aſk the Merchants, if they don't entirely feel your Reaſons for ſo doing. What can be a more envenom'd Satire againſt thoſe M——rs you are defending, than ſuggeſting that Fifteen or Twenty thouſand Men would have produced a Diſtreſs which *you* are afraid to look upon? for that is the *Engliſh* of the *Veil* and the *Scene*. Good Heavens! that you, a

Sub-

Subject born to Freedom, ſhould renounce the *Love* of your *Country*, the firſt Chriſtian and Pagan Virtue, and have the Face to defend the Actions of M——rs, who you confeſs have reduced and left this once opulent and powerful Iſland, containing *two Millions* of Men able to bear Arms, open to Invaſion, and to ſuffering ſuch *Scenes*, as *even you* are afraid to look upon, from *fifteen* or *twenty* thouſand *Frenchmen*. How ſimilar in their Lives and Characters are thoſe who defend the Deſtroyers of their native Land to the Men they dare to juſtify. I hope there are but three Men more in the Kingdom who would dare ſuch an Action, *S—e*, *B—w*, and *T--k--r*. And this wretched State to which *England* is reduced, it is that the Merchants feel ſo intimately when they read your Defence.

After all the Danger and Diſtreſs of that *Scene* in your *Eye*, expreſt with ſuch puffing Pathetic, you tell us, " The Ad—n did not " look upon it as a Meaſure taken abſolutely " at *Verſailles*, nor as the only one in the Plan " of that ambitious Court; they were fully " appriſed of the Preparations carrying on " at *Toulon*, and they were aware that ei- " ther of theſe Schemes might prove the " Feint or Reality;" and therefore very cunningly provided againſt *neither* of them.

Not againſt *that* for the taking *Minorca*, the Event has proved, not only by not ſending Succours and a ſufficient Fleet, but by ſending none that could arrive till long after they muſt have been aſſured the *French* were landed. And you, by confeſſing the Danger we were in from Fifteen thouſand Men, have acknowledged, as well as by the ſtationing of the Ships, that this Iſland was equally neglected. You then ſay, "This "*French* Fleet *might* ſail thro' the Straights "of *Gibraltar*, either to ſuccour their Colo- "nies in North *America*, or to put our Fleet "in the Ocean betwixt the two Fires of the "*Breſt* and *Toulon* Squadrons." You mean, I ſuppoſe, by *might*, it was barely poſſible; but was it more probable than their attacking *Conſtantinople* by way of reducing *England?* If your M—e M—r knew the Fleet was fitting at *Toulon*, he knew the Nature of the Ships which were engaged for tranſporting the Troops; theſe were chiefly Tartans, Veſſels adapted to the mild Seas and ſhort Voyages of the *Mediterranean*, as little able to bear the Storms of the *Atlantic* Ocean as you are to defend the M——r. Was it probable then that theſe Ships were deſigned for *America*, particularly when it was known that the Duke *de Richlieu* was to command the

the Expedition, who would as ſoon attempt to defend your Writings as a Voyage to that Part of the World? And pray, were the *old Women* and *live* Oxen to go to *America* in Tartans alſo? Was this probable to any Heads but ſuch as yours and of thoſe whom you defend? Improbable as this muſt appear, the coming with all this Apparatus of two hundred Tranſports, to put our Fleet between two Fires, is yet even more incredible and ridiculous. Could that from *Toulon* and that from *Breſt* have met as regularly as the two Parts of a Pair of Sciſſars, and have cut off our Fleet betwixt them? If not, one coming before the other, muſt, as it was inferior to ours, probably have been beaten, and, not unlikely, the other after it; and ſurely they would not have incumber'd themſelves with ſo many Tranſports in ſuch an Undertaking. But let us ſuppoſe either of theſe was the Deſign, was the *Toulon* Fleet therefore to be neglected, and not a ſufficient Force ſent to oppoſe it? Thus you ſee that the Head and Heart had been left expoſed to Danger, if the two Fleets, according to your own Account, had taken ours between two Fires, and the Limbs have been as little taken care of alſo; for I believe that thoſe two Fleets, after engaging ours off of *Breſt*, where their Superiority would moſt likely have

have given them the Victory, might have proceeded directly to the Heart, for any Interruption that the Fleet which you have deſcribed could have given them: and thus, according to your Way of thinking, the delaying a Fleet for the *Mediterranean*, lay open the Head and Heart of *England* to an Invaſion.

But now you come to tell us, our moſt *vigorous* Endeavours however were uſed to ſecure *this* Part of the *Britiſh* Dominions likewiſe; as well as to ſend out a *Force ſufficient* for our *Colonies*; that is, on the ſecond and third of *March*; two Months after you acknowledge the having ſeen a Letter which gave an Account of the *Toulon* Squadron and Expedition. You ſay, *our*, that is, *yours* and the M——e M——r's moſt vigorous Endeavours were uſed to ſecure this Part of the *Britiſh* Dominions alſo. I am afraid that this *Vigor* in preparing a Fleet is pretty much like a *Vigor* of another Kind, for which he has been no leſs remarkable. At this Diſtance of Time, you ſay Orders were firſt iſſued for preſſing from Protections, and laying an Embargo on all Merchant-ſhips. Now pray, why were theſe Orders ſo long delay'd? Do you imagine your

your Note aſſerting that *March* is the ordinary Month for fitting out Ships will be an Excuſe for the Delay? The Merchants will tell you that *January* and *February* are equally ſo, and where would you drive the Sailors in any of theſe Months more than in *March*, when an Embargo was laid on the Merchant Ships? And why were the Ten Ships *firſt* order'd to be fitted out on the *third* of *March* for the *Mediterranean*, when you and the M———r had certain Intelligence of the *Toulon* Preparations in *December?* Then you ſay, " From this fair Deduction of Par-
" ticulars, it follows clearly, that a Squadron
" of equal Strength could not have been diſ-
" patch'd to the *Mediterranean* conſiſtently
" with the Security of this Kingdom. And
" thus much in Reply to the firſt Queſtion."
Now, tho' this Reply has been evidently proved to be totally inſufficient, I ſhall immediately ſhow you that your laſt Words are all a Falſhood, and that a much greater Fleet might have been ſpared, *conſiſtent* with the *Security* of this Kingdom.

We now come particularly to the Caſe of Mr. *Byng*; where you tell us, " the ill Suc-
" ceſs of our *Mediterranean* Squadron has
" given Occaſion to ſay, that a greater Force
" ſhould

" ſhould have been ſent. Let us ſee then,
" whether we could have reaſonably ſpared
" more Ships at that Time; and to judge of
" this, we muſt look *impartially* into the
" State of our Fleet at Home, juſt before the
" Squadron in queſtion put to Sea. Exclu-
" ſive of it, and Six Ships more for the Co-
" lonies, there remained either cruiſing or
" going to cruiſe, Twenty-ſix; and in Har-
" bour Twenty-four, *not under ſailing Orders.*
" Of the latter, Nine only were otherwiſe
" ready, could they have been manned; but
" they wanted of their Complement above
" Eleven hundred; and the Six Ships deſign'd
" for the Colonies wanted Three hundred and
" Seventy-ſeven. The remaining Fifteen, of
" the Twenty-four in Harbour, were either
" fitting or refitting. They muſter'd about
" Eight hundred Foremaſt-men; however
" you ſay, by means of theſe, and ſtripping
" one Ship, it would be juſt poſſible to man
" the other *eight*; and then Thirty-four Ships
" of the Line were the whole Force we had
" to employ in Services at Home; of which
" it was now indiſpenſably neceſſary to have
" *nineteen* cruiſing before *Breſt* and *Roch-*
" *fort.*"

HERE,

HERE, I fancy, it will be proved, you did not know the State of the Fleet, or have deſignedly miſrepreſented it. It appears that ſome of theſe were actually cruiſing. You ſhould have told the Number and of thoſe going to cruiſe alſo. Do you imagine that Ships being *named* to cruiſe, is a ſufficient Reaſon that they ſhall not be *countermanded*, when a greater Service requires them? Their being *deſtined* to cruiſe then, is no Juſtification for their not being ſent to the *Mediterranean*, tho' their being on actual Cruiſe may. And yet, even in this Caſe, thoſe ſhould have been recall'd for this *moſt* important *Service*; as all leſſer Advantages ought for ever to yield to the acquiring greater, when both cannot be obtain'd. But, " thirty-four, (you " ſay, excluſive of Mr. *Byng*'s and the Co- " lony Squadron) were all that could truly " be reckon'd fit for the Sea; and the whole " Force we had to employ in Service at " Home; of which it was now indiſpenſably " neceſſary to have *nineteen* cruizing before " *Breſt* and *Rochfort*." Here, Sir, you miſrepreſent or forget; Sir *Edward Hawke* had ſail'd, according to your own Account, the 12th of *March*, with *fourteen* Sail of the *Line*. Now if nineteen were judged neceſ-

ſary to cruiſe before *Breſt*, five additional Ships would have completed that Number. For certainly you don't mean to ſay, that the former fourteen were to be join'd by nineteen more, in all thirty-three Ships, or to be changed after a three Weeks Cruiſe. Thus, inſtead of nineteen being wanted, five only of the thirty-four were neceſſary; and then the remaining Number would have been twenty-nine, beſides Mr. *Byng*'s Squadron, and that for the Colonies. Is it not Pity that ſuch an *impartial* Writer, ſuch a candid *Lover* of Truth, a *Man* diveſted of all Deſign to ſerve any *Cauſe* but that of his *Country*, ſhould have ſo ſhort a Memory? Thus, Sir, you have given a falſe Repreſentation, according to your own Way of ſtating the Navy; and as Things did *not* ſtand as you repreſent them, all *your* Reaſons deduced from thence muſt fall to the Ground; and your Arguments, which were offer'd for not ſending a Fleet into the *Mediterranean* in *March*, and refuted, are here again proved to be abſolutely inſufficient.

You affirm alſo, " that there was not the " leaſt apparent Neceſſity for ſending a Fleet " ſooner than this under Mr. *Byng*;" tho' you have already ſaid, you were acquainted with

with the *Toulon* Preparations as long ſince as *December*. And then ſay, " That ten Sail, " with three already in thoſe Seas, making " in all eleven of the Line, and two Forty- " eight Gun Ships, compoſed a Strength ſu- " perior to any the *French* could have there, " even according to the largeſt Accounts." And this, after you have told us, that you knew in *December* the *French* Fleet would conſiſt of twelve Ships of the Line. You increaſe every Minute in the Goodneſs of your Memory, or your Love of Truth. And ſuch a Fleet you ſay, " might probably have enſured Succeſs." But how was theM——r ſure that Mr. *Byng* and Mr. *Edgecumbe* could join? We ſhall ſee immediately if this Probability was well founded.

THE next Thing you enter upon, is the Equipment of Mr. *Byng*'s Fleet; in which you as ſtrenuouſly adhere to the Truth, as you have all along. You declare no Fleet was ever better equip'd, or mann'd with abler Hands. As to the Equipping, the contrary is remarkable; not a Store-ſhip, Fire-ſhip, or Hoſpital-ſhip, Things never omitted till then, was to accompany ſo large a Fleet. Theſe, three eſſential Particulars then, were wanting in the Equipment; the *Intrepid*

alſo, which arrived at that Time, was given in at *Spithead* to the Admiral, by Captain *Young*, as unfit for a foreign Voyage; becauſe ſhe had made ſo much Water thro' her upper Works, tho' the Ports were caulk'd, that he had been obliged to ſkuttle the lower Deck, to let the Water into the Hold, in order to be pump'd up: in this Condition ſhe ſail'd. One of the Squadron was not well equip'd then; beſides which, one or two more of the Fleet wanted careening. Your next Aſſertion is, " That the *Toulon* Squadron " was ill mann'd, made up of the Sweepings " of *Toulon*, old Men paſt Service, and Boys " not come to it." Theſe things are eaſily ſaid, though the contrary is eaſy to be proved; but ſuppoſing the Fleet ill manned at its leaving *Toulon*, it was much otherwiſe on the Day of Battle; the Admiral had all the Sailors of two hundred Tranſports to add to his Crews, and then to chooſe the beſt for his Squadron, and put the worſt to look after the Tranſports at Anchor; and by this Means no Fleet was ever better mann'd than that of *La Galiſſoniere* on the Day of Battle. What Regard then is there to be paid to what you ſay? You then ſtop to make an Obſervation worthy ſo keen an Underſtanding, " that " Ships though in Commiſſion, yet not pre-

" pared

" pared for the Seas, ought not to be rec-
" koned fit for Service." Which is as ſhrewd as my old Aunt's Obſervation, that *Sampſon*, though the ſtrongeſt Man, could not put on his Breeches before he had them.

You then ſay, " With ſuch a Squadron,
" that is, with ten Ships of the Line, Mr.
" *Byng* ſet ſail the 6th of *April*; and that it
" is with equal Shame and Indignation you
" purſue the Sequel of the Narrative, wiſh-
" ing it to be buried in Oblivion, for the
" Diſgrace it has brought on the *Britiſh*
" Flag, and the fatal Diſaſters conſequent on
" that Diſgrace, by ONE MAN's ———,
" but let the Juſtice of the Nation give it a
" Name." And I add, fix who that ONE MAN is, if they are not already unanimous that this Misfortune is owing to the ſame MAN, who has never ſtation'd one Fleet right ſince the Beginning of the War. Then you are taken with a fit of Tenderneſs about condemning the greateſt ſuppoſed Criminal, juſt after you have been exerting every thing but Truth to condemn him in your Readers Opinion. Are not you, in fact, the Thing you pretend to abhor, unjuſt, ungenerous, and a-kin to Cowardice?

And in this Place you muſt excuſe my chooſing to inſert a few Things which you have *choſen* to ſuppreſs, it is the different Behaviour of Mr. *Byng* and the M———e M—r for a little while before the Admiral ſailed, and then aſk you a few Queſtions.

It moſt undeniably appears, that the haſtening out the Fleet was not the Purſuit of the M——e M——r, becauſe at Mr. *Byng*'s Arrival at *Portſmouth*, he was ordered poſitively not to man his Fleet out of the *Torbay*, *Eſſex*, *Prince Frederick*, *Colcheſter*, or *Greyhound*, or, if poſſible to be avoided, with any Ships Crews in a ſerviceable Condition, under the Notion of being wanted on more preſſing Service. Was not this done with Deſign to delay his Departure as much as poſſible, and preferring the inferior to the ſuperior Object, as no ſuch preſſing Service has ever ſince wanted them?

Does it not ſeem to coincide with the Idea of giving up *Minorca*, all along ſo viſible, by ſtill detaining the Means of Relief? On the 21ſt of *March*, in the Evening, the Admiral received a Letter from the Secretary of the A———ty, at the Command of Mr. *Fox*, preſſing

preſſing the utmoſt Diligence in getting his Squadron into ſailing Order, explaining the Neceſſity he was under of being ready for immediate Service in the *Mediterranean*, and incloſing the Reaſons in an Extract of a Letter from Lord *Briſtol* at *Turin*, to Mr. *Fox*, communicating the Intention of the *French* to invade *Minorca*.

In anſwer to this, the Admiral expreſſes his uſing all poſſible Diſpatch, and that in *eight* or *ten* Days he hoped to be ready; at the ſame time accompanying this with a State of the Ships, intimating thereby that from theſe, if an Order was diſpatched to him to take what were ready, he might be at Sea in a few Hours.

And here, not to do as you do, lump the Ships cruiſing and not cruiſing, under ſailing Orders and not under ſailing Orders; I will give you the Names of thoſe that were at *Portſmouth*: There was the Admiral's Diviſion of ten, beſides this, the *Prince* of 90, the *Prince George* of 80, the *Invincible* and *Torbay* of 74, the *Monmouth*, *Yarmouth*, *Eſſex*, *Naſſau*, and *Prince Frederick* of 64, the *Nottingham*, *Princeſs Auguſta*, and *Anſon* of 60 Guns; all theſe Ships, twelve of the

the Line, were full mann'd, or had more than their Complements.

In the Harbour, the *Royal Ann* and *Duke* of 90, the *Barfleur* of 80, the *Swiftfure*, *Bedford*, and *Elizabeth* of 64, the *Briſtol* and *Colcheſter* of 50, the *Romney* 40, the *Greyhound*, *Gibraltar*, *Nightingale*, and *Unicorn* of 20 Guns. All of which except the four firſt were mann'd.

Tell me then, why the M——e M——r did not immediately order a Squadron to proceed to Sea, and increaſe it by the Means of theſe Ships ready for ſailing; particularly as Mr. *Kepple* was ordered by the Letter received, in anſwer to Mr. *Byng*'s, to ſail as ſoon as poſſible with the *Eſſex*, *Gibraltar*, and *Unicorn* on a Cruiſe? Theſe might have been added to the *Mediterranean* Squadron, without leſſening the home Defence? Why did he not order full mann'd Ships to be taken, and change the *Intrepid*, and thoſe that wanted Careening, for Ships perfectly equipt? Why did he not order the Admiral to man his Fleet immediately from the others? Why did not he add three Line of Battle Ships to the *Eſſex*, and join them to the *Mediterranean* Squadron? Three Ships could not

not have preſerved this Nation. Why did the M——e M——r delay the Fleet from the 25th of *March* to the 6th of *April*, after the Letter came to Mr. *Fox*'s Hands and from him to the Admiral, by not doing as is juſt ſaid, and by ſtill ordering Mr. *Byng* to man his Fleet from Tenders and Hoſpital-ſhips only; and then not till the *Sterling-Caſtle* was provided with her Complement? Theſe are Things which you did well to hide amongſt your Inſtructions, not fit to be revealed, for the ſame Reaſon that this was concealed. Is there any Man who can longer believe even ſuch Ignorance as the M——e M———r poſſeſſes could have been the ſole Cauſe of this Delay, eſpecially after Mr. *Fox* had order'd him to expedite the Fleet and ſhewn him his Intelligence? There muſt be ſome other Reaſon in this premeditated Delay; I wiſh I was not convinced that the Duke *de Mirepoix* had Two hundred and Seventy-four thouſand Pounds remitted him from *France* a little before he left this Kingdom.

Putting all theſe Things together, is it credible that *Minorca* was ever intended to be relieved; particularly when it is obſerved, that the general and ſubaltern Officers

of the Regiments at *Mahon*, to the Number of ſixty, were all the Time of this Preparation at *Toulon* ſuffer'd to remain in *England*; that Six thouſand Troops offer'd to this Court by the *Modeneſe* Miniſter, were refuſed; and that no Reinforcements were ſent, nor Regard paid to *Blakeney*'s Requeſt, who is but now ſuffer'd to return, hoping, as they were, that old Age might cloſe thoſe Lips from uttering ſuch Truths as muſt undo the M—r.

And laſtly, when it is farther remarked, that a Fleet even *beaten* before the *French* had landed in *Minorca*, could have ſaved the Place, becauſe it would have had a Harbour to retire to and refit, and ſupplied the Garriſon and Iſland with Men to repel the Enemy.

As to the Determinations of the Council of War, you will excuſe me if I believe that thoſe Men on the Spot, Judges of the whole Affair, have founded their Deciſion on better Reaſons than you have conceived to found your Concluſions on; and when you tell us they reaſon'd amiſs in determining that *Gibraltar* was in danger if the Fleet was beaten, and that it ran no danger at all becauſe it has not been *ſince* attacked. I will allow you the Force of this Argument, if you pleaſe,

taking the ſame Advantage to myſelf alſo, that this Kingdom has *not* been in danger of an Attack, becauſe it has *not* been attacked; and therefore our whole Fleet might have been ſent on real Service. Beſides, the Defence of *Gibraltar* was one Article in Mr. *Byng*'s Orders. The Council of War then were not more out in their Judgment than the M——e M——r. How impartial you appear in the Repreſentations and Inferences which you make in the two ſimilar Caſes of *Gibraltar* and *England*.

You now come to "Mr. *Byng*'s arriving "off *Minorca* at the very Time that a Com- "mander of Spirit and Enterprize would "have wiſhed preciſely to arrive," as *you* declare; and then you add the Reaſon, "be- "cauſe ſuch a Commander had an Oppor- "tunity of engaging the Enemy's Fleet, and "*probably* ruining the whole Undertaking, "with moſt Reputation to himſelf and moſt "Glory to his Country. Could a *Greenville* "or a *Drake* ariſe for a Moment from the "Dead, to pronounce upon this Opinion, "I am confident, by all they thought and "acted upon ſimilar Occaſions, they would "heartily confirm it." And I am confident that as you have been *confidently* wrong in all you have ſaid hitherto, that you are in this

alſo, and that *Greenville*, *Drake*, and you may add Admiral *Warren*, are of Opinion, that in comparing the two Actions of the M——e M———r and Mr. *Byng*, that of the firſt in the Channel, and that of the latter in the *Mediterranean*; if your Friend deſerved a Barony for that Action, *Byng* deſerves a Dukedom for his, and if *Byng* deſerves Death, the other deſerves it with Torture; for certain it is, the Succeſs of that Action in the Channel was entirely owing to the ſuperior Skill and Courage of Sir *Peter Warren*; and if being diſtant from the Enemy is a Crime, how great is that of the M—e M———r, who was not within nine Miles of the Enemy during the Engagement? why is he ſeized with Horrors at the Word CHACE? and had not Sir *Peter* broke thro' the Orders of the Commander in Chief, the whole *French* Fleet would have eſcaped, as too many did by the prepoſterous Behaviour of the Man you dare to defend. Wherefore an Examination of Mr. *Byng* and him, as Commanders in the Day of Battle, may probably be given to the Public hereafter. Let me now enquire on what you ground your *Probability* of all this Glory to Mr. *Byng* and the Nation; this will be beſt done by comparing the two Fleets.

FIRST

FIRST the *Engliſh* and *French* Fleets were equal in Number of Ships. From this Circumſtance no *probable* Advantage could be drawn in favour of one Side above another.

La Galiſſoniere was ſuperior in Number of Guns, according to the M———l Account, by twenty-two, and according to the true Account, fifty. Here the Probability of Succeſs is againſt Mr. *Byng*, as much as fifty can influence in 932 Cannon, which is equal to a Fifty-gun Ship; thus *La Galiſſoniere* in this Reſpect was thirteen to twelve againſt *Byng*.

IN Weight of Metal, the Shot of the *Foudroyant* exceeds that of the *Ramillies*, in each general Diſcharge, by five hundred ſeventy-two Pounds, almoſt a third of the whole Weight; in Men allow'd for Small-Arms, the ſame Superiority exiſts in Favour of the *Foudroyant*, as may be ſeen in the *Appeal to the People*. Thus then on account of theſe ſuperior Powers, if you add, a Third of the Number Twelve, to *La Galiſſoniere*, the *French* will be increaſed as ſixteen to twelve; and then taking in alſo the Number of fifty Guns, already mentioned, as another Ship,

the

the Enemy's Fleet muſt be conſidered as ſeventeen to twelve. Now, Sir, on what *Probability*, in Favour of *England*, could an Admiral of Spirit and Enterprize found his Expectations of ruining the Undertaking of the *French?* Nay, had he conquer'd, is there a *Probability* of his being able to keep the Seas and relieve *Mahon*, as he had no Soldiers to land, and his diminiſhed Crews would have required all his Hands to navigate his Ships, through fear of being attacked in returning home? Are not you as excellent at calculating Probabilities as in the Knowledge of common Arithmetic, meaſuring Time, Acquaintance with Geography, Love of Truth, and Service of your Country? Now do you ſtill believe, the Probability of Succeſs remains on the Side of *England*, if *Greenville* and *Drake* could be Judges? You then let looſe a Rant "about a daſtardly half-ſoul'd "Race—Romantic—Viſionary—Gallantry "—Nobleneſs of Spirit—*Britain*—degenerate Pirates and Free-booters; that "our Commanders ſolicit Employments, "not for the ſake of glorious *Danger*, but "to wear the Livery for humbler Motives." Is not this the Scurrility you complain of? This I am afraid hits as hard as any thing can well do upon your M—e M——r, whoſe

whoſe Voyage round the World was more of that piratical and free-booting Order than any I remember, and who, ſnug from *Danger*, at preſent wears the Livery and is paid for only having hoiſted his Flag at *Spithead*, dined on board with the D—e, as Admiral, on Leave of Abſence from that time to this. Had not you better have blotted out this Paſſage?

You now tell us, the *French*, diſcovering the *Engliſh* Fleet, ſent for a Reinforcement from the Duke *de Richlieu*; and that thoſe Men were ſent out in Tartans to the Aſſiſtance of the Fleet. And then you aſk, if this is not a Confirmation of the bad Condition in which their Fleet put to Sea? Now theſe Men were all *Land Soldiers* to increaſe the Number of Small Arms; an admirable Proof of the Fleet's Want of *Sailors*; juſt as good as if I ſhould infer that having no Beef a-board Ship, the Fleet wanted Water; or becauſe you have not *common* Senſe in your Arguments, that therefore you want a *good* Stomach. The Numbers on-board were ſtill, notwithſtanding the taking theſe, and preventing more, as 17 to 12; was not that Superiority enough? Indeed I think with you, *that Day* of *Battle* will be long remember'd by the Friends

Friends of *England* with Pain; and I hope will be mark'd with exemplary Juſtice on thoſe who conſpired to produce the Calamities which it has already, and muſt hereafter, bring on this ſinking Nation.

You now, as you advance, grow more refined in your Obſervations; and pronounce "that the taking One hundred and ſix Men, "Officers and Soldiers, in two Tartans, was "*particularly* encourageing; and might have "been interpreted without much Superſtition "into an Aſſurance of Victory." And why? "Becauſe every Circumſtance to confirm "the Bold, or animate the Fearful, concur-"red on our Side, the Sailors all in high Spi-"rits, the Officers determined and eager to "ſhew themſelves *Engliſhmen*;" and how do you know but the *French* were as high-ſpirited, and as eager to ſhew themſelves *Frenchmen?* "And the Wind blowing all "Day long to favour our Attack;" which is no Favour at all, unleſs the Admiral had been prepared with Fire-ſhips to ſend in amongſt the Enemy's Fleet to Leeward; and thoſe your M——e M——r had not permitted to accompany him. Now do you and the ſagacious head you are defending believe that high Spirits, Eagerneſs, and a fair Wind, ought to

to create an Aſſurance of Victory combined with the taking two Tartans and One hundred and ſix Men, againſt an Enemy's Fleet which was as ſeventeen to twelve; and all the other Circumſtances upon an equal Footing?

I ſhall now wave your next Paragraph, and tell you the Reaſon. Admiral *Byng* has never entertain'd the leaſt Idea of juſtifying himſelf to the People, concerning his Conduct, except in relation to the Parts of his Letter, which were caſtrated by the M——r; and this with Deſign only to take off that popular Prejudice which had by means of thoſe Omiſſions, and other mean Artifices, been raiſed againſt him: that his Fate might not, under the People's Reſentment, be *determined* by his Enemies, to ſkreen themſelves, and ſatisfy the Nation; whoſe Anger they had ſo artfully contrived to be kept alive againſt him.

You ſay, "You can give no Account of "his Behaviour on the Day of Battle;" As good as *you* have given of any other Part, I am convinced; but tho' *you* can *not*, Mr. *Byng will*; and ſuch as your M—e M——r *would* give one half the Booty of his Voyage round the World to be able to produce in



IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)







Photographic Sciences Corporation

23 WEST MAIN STREET
WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580
(716) 872-4503

25
22
20
18
10

favour of his Conduct. Mr. *Byng* wiſhes to be tried, and ſeeks no Compact to prevent Juſtice and the Day of Trial, as thoſe Men do, whoſe whole Endeavour is to cede their Places on the *ſcandalous* Conditions of *no* Impeachment; and which it is preſumed, the Men who have ſo far proceeded to ſerve our Country, will exert every Endeavour to prevent; obtaining *Juſtice on our domeſtic Enemies*, ought to be the Cry of every honeſt *Engliſhman*. Wherefore, it is aſtoniſhing to the honeſt Part of the Nation, that whilſt Mr. *Byng* is cloſe confined for what is now even in the worſt View conſidered as a much inferior Crime, the great Author of our preſent Evils, by wrong Conduct, from Ignorance, or ſome more iniquitous Motive, is ſuffer'd to be at *large*, and probably to eſcape the Nation's *Demands* for *Juſtice*, by flying into the Lands of thoſe to whom he has ſo remarkably proved the Friend.

HERE again you return to a Fit of Tenderneſs, and Abhorrence of the popular Averſion to Mr. *Byng*, and thoſe who have promoted it; in which I can ſcarce believe you are ſincere, becauſe you muſt then *hate* the very *Man* you are defending, who has been the moſt inſtrumental in thoſe Diſgraces to our national Character.

racter. But probably you wiſh to ſuppreſs this Spirit in the People, thro' Fear that hanging and burning the M——e M——r may one Day become as common as that of Mr. *Byng has* been.

You then finiſh your Paragraph by ſaying, " Another and a more equitable Tribunal " than that of popular Fury, muſt determine " what we are to think of this Day's Action, " and of this Gentleman's Behaviour;" and I hope of the M——e M——r's: Or, I conclude, the People of *England* will never reſt ſatisfied under the Ignominy and Injury which has been brought upon the Honour of the Crown and Nation.

You now call *The Letter to a Member of Parliament*, in Favour of Mr. *Byng*, a *Libel*; What then is *your Defence?* But let the Author of that Letter take Cognizance of you on that Account, and I will tell you where you may ſee ſufficient Proofs that your M——e M—r had determined to ſerve himſelf by the Admiral's Deſtruction; in the *Appeal to the People*, which you have never mention'd, tho' publiſh'd long before your Defence, and for good Reaſons; otherwiſe, without ſuch Intention, would they have cut out of his

Letter his Juſtification for not returning to *Minorca* after the Battle, the Ships being ſo greatly damaged, the Sickneſs of the Sailors, and no Hoſpital-ſhip? his not being able to preſerve *St. Philip's*, from having no Soldiers? his doing all he could for the Citadel, before the *French* appear'd in Sight? and the great Damage he had received from the heavier Weight of Metal, and Inferiority of his Ships? Other Parts would have told you of the neglected State of *Gibraltar*; the Admiral's Reſolution of returning to ſeek the Enemy as ſoon as refitted; and how neceſſary in his Opinion and in fact, a Reinforcement was towards Succeſs in relieving *Mahon*; and laſtly, his retiring to cover *Gibraltar*; which made one of the Articles of his Orders. Are not theſe Omiſſions then ſo many Proofs that Mr. *Byng*'s *ſuppoſed* Errors were to be augmented, and their own *real Ones* excuſed?

In the ſame Sentiments of preſerving the Idea of Mr. *Byng*'s Delinquency, before the Eyes of the People, and themſelves from being obſerved; it was reported, he had ſold forty thouſand Pounds out of the Stocks: with a View of inſinuating, that he ſet out with a Determination never to return. That he

he had taken Money formerly before *Genoa*: to intimate he was capable of being bribed. That a Ship got into *Mahon* the Day of the Battle, to prove he might have done the ſame; then he and Mr. *Weſt* were ſent for Home to be confined; and Mr. *Weſt* permitted his Liberty without a Witneſs examined, to inſinuate one guilty and the other innocent; and all this on the ſole Evidence of the Enemy's Letter. Then the Judgment of the whole Council of War was depreciated, to add to the Crimes of the Admiral. He was then eſcaping, running mad, attempting Suicide; after this the *honeſt* Informer in the *Evening Advertiſer* was put upon his Back to *inform* the People of his Crimes. All theſe Things having been proved falſe, and maliciouſly invented, are they not ſo many Particulars which prove that he was deſtin'd the Scape-goat of a pernicious M——r? and as all theſe Attempts have turn'd againſt thoſe who deſign'd them againſt Mr. *Byng*, *you* now come in once more to recall the People's Reſentment upon him, and to defend the M——r; both which are equally impoſſible. You then aſk, if his Saying, "every one was of Opinion he could be "of no Uſe to General *Blakeney*, as by "all Accounts no Place was ſecured for "a Landing, is the Language of Courage?"

Yes,

Yes, and of Prudence too, or every Officer in the Expedition muſt be condemn'd of Cowardice, a thing not eaſily to be believed. And becauſe Mr. *Boyd*, in an open Boat, went out and returned to *Mahon*, you conclude that a thouſand Boats might have landed Troops unmoleſted; and yet forget that the M——r ought to have ſent Troops with him, if he intended any ſhould have been landed before the Engagement; and, after it, the Condition of Mr *Byng*'s Fleet would not have permitted him if he had carried them out with him.

FROM what has been ſaid, does it not fairly follow, that all which *you* have aſſerted, in defence of the M———r, is exactly like what *he* has done for the Nation, falſe, and pernicious? Nay, may I not venture to affirm, that had all that you have uttered been true, it could have been no Vindication of the M———r.

How could this have juſtified his raiſing ſuch enormous Taxes, on a harraſſed People, ſix times the Sum which was levied at the Revolution? His Profuſion of the public Money, gotten by the hard Labour of the induſtrious Natives, ſquander'd in *German* Schemes,

Schemes, on mercenary *Hanoverians* and *Heſſians*; concluding contradictory Treaties, affronting *Ruſſia*, renouncing *Auſtria*, diſarming and keeping diſarmed the *Engliſh*, exempting foreign Hirelings from the Laws of the Land, ſpreading Corruption every where, preferring Men of infamous Characters in the Church, to the Neglect of Learning and Piety, excluding Men of Senſe and Integrity from the M———y, ſelecting thoſe who are void of Principle and Underſtanding, added to what has been already proved, completing an Accumulation of Guilt, that no M——r, till now, has ever heaped together, nor this Nation ever beheld.

Tell me then, with what Face you could preſume to call this an impartial Examination of the Conduct of the Miniſtry, who have not dared to ſpeak of their Capital Delinquencies, and have only confirmed the contrary of what you intended to have juſtified?

To promote the Service of my Country was the Cauſe of my writing, and as far as you have proved to the contrary hitherto, nothing but Truth; and if I eat my daily Bread from this Service, no Man has ever yet lived on honeſter

honeſter Bread than that which paſſes my Lips; for as long as the Endeavour to preſerve the Liberties and Conſtitution of a Nation ſhall be deemed honourable, ſo long muſt my Attempts be eſteemed amongſt Mankind; this nothing but my own Fault can ever deprive me of, and till I have forfeited my Right to it, nothing can diveſt me of a Pleaſure which lives continually in my Breaſt, that I have aſſiſted in removing the Deſtroyers of the Kingdom from before the King and People, and that the very Men, who muſt ſave (if it be yet poſſible to preſerve) this Country, have eſpouſed the ſame manner of thinking, and are choſen for that very Reaſon: I have the Nation adopting and uniting in what I ſay; you the iniquitous Dependants of more iniquitous M———rs; and though you ſay in the Beginning, that you have done every thing to avoid being impoſed upon and impoſing, you bear through the whole ſuch deep-burnt Stigmas of Falſification, that Ignorance, great as yours, cannot cover them from the Eyes of your Readers.

Who then deſerves the Name of Libeller, you who dare to Attempt the ſcreening Men who have brought their Country to the brink of Ruin, or I who have held out a Light

to the People to warn them of approaching Deſtruction? If mine be a Crime, it is laudable ſilently to behold a Houſe in Flames and never attempt to extinguiſh it; to ſee Thieves robbing my honeſt Neighbour, and not endeavour to oppoſe it. If yours be praiſe-worthy, to plunder and conſume in Flames are honeſt: and which you would probably perpetrate alſo, for your Advantage, could it be done with Impunity. As I now know that the Acquiſition of your Fortune, from not being truſted with a Loaf, has riſen from *defrauding* your Country, and *ſtarving* the unhappy *Priſoner*, *who*, the Moment he becomes a *Captive*, in all generous Minds, *ceaſes* to be an *Enemy*.

In defending the M———r you ſtrive to defend *yourſelf* in vain, with whom you have long been a cloſe and iniquitous *Aſſociate*.

No wonder then you expreſs ſuch Antipathy to Gallows-makers, when ſeeing over whoſe Heads they hang, and reflecting on your Deſerts, you tremble to think how near they are to your own, eſpecially ſhould the *Magnanime* and the Six thouſand Pounds, with other ſimilar Circumſtances, ſhoot a-croſs your Mind at the ſame time.

As to myſelf, I have no perſonal Pique againſt thoſe who have lately been eminently ſuperior in Power and Deſtruction, nor perſonal Eſteem for thoſe who at preſent promiſe their Endeavours to ſave this Land; equally unknowing of and unknown to each. I entertain no Chagrin from Denial, becauſe I have never aſked; I have never expected, and therefore can never have been diſappointed, and would rather *live* and *die* like *Maſſaniello*, the bare-footed Fiſherman of *Naples*, and be inſtrumental in ſaving my Country, than enjoy all the Riches, Honors, Poſts, and Power of the Lord ——— and his Family, in the manner which he has obtained them. But let it be your Imployment to perſiſt in juſtifying the Ruiners of your Country and Fellow-ſubjects, and mine the laying open their nefarious Deſigns, then let the World decide whether I moſt reſemble the *Incendiary*, who writes Letters to extort Money from the Worthy; or you a *ſuborn'd Evidence* in favour of *Accomplices* more criminal by this *Defence* which you have written for the M———r.

F I N I S.

ERRATA.

Page 12, l. 13, after *reſtored alſo*, dele *?*; p. 27, l. 10, dele "; p. 28. l. 22, for *what Place*, r. *what* higher *Place*; p. 42. l. 26, for *preach* r. *follow*; p. 46. l. 2. r. *Jamaica is as*; p. 55, l. 26, for 14th r. 24th; l. 27, for 14th, r. 24th; l. 28, r. was *almoſt* two; p. 56, l. 4, for 14th, r. 24; l. 5, read is, dele *moſt* four.

que a-
tly fu-
erfonal
e their
ly un-
tertain
never
erefore
would
bare-
nftru-
joy all
of the
anner
it be
ng the
bjects,
s De-
her I
writes
y; or
ccom-
which

p. 28.
preach r.
24th;
for 14th,